Information security : National Nuclear Security Administration needs to improve contingency planning for its classified supercomputing operations : report to congressional requesters.

Format:

Book

Government document

Author/Creator:

United States. Government Accountability Office

Contributor:

Aloise, Gene

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

United States. National Nuclear Security Administration--Rules and practice--Evaluation.

United States.

United States. National Nuclear Security Administration--Planning--Evaluation.

United States. National Nuclear Security Administration.

Nuclear weapons--United States--Testing.

Nuclear weapons.

Computer security.

Data recovery (Computer science)--Planning.

Data recovery (Computer science).

Emergency management.

Nuclear weapons--Testing.

Planning--Evaluation.

Genre:

Rules and practice.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (ii, 34 pages) : illustrations

Other Title:

National Nuclear Security Administration needs to improve contingency planning for its classified supercomputing operations

NNSA contingency planning

Place of Publication:

[Washington, D.C.] : U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, [2010]

Notes:

Title from cover screen (GAO, viewed on Dec. 15, 2010).

"December 2010."

In the absence of underground nuclear weapons testing, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) relies on its supercomputing operations at its three weapons laboratories to simulate the effects of changes to current weapons systems, calculate the confidence of future untested systems, and ensure military requirements are met. GAO was requested to assess the extent to which (1) NNSA has implemented contingency and disaster recovery planning and testing for its classified supercomputing systems, (2) the laboratories are able to share supercomputing capacity for recovery operations, and (3) NNSA tracks the costs for contingency and disaster recovery planning for supercomputing assets. To do this work, GAO examined contingency and disaster recovery planning policies and activities, and analyzed classified supercomputing capabilities at the weapons laboratories, and NNSA budgetary data. GAO recommends, among other things, that NNSA clearly define roles and responsibilities for its component organizations in providing oversight for contingency and disaster recovery planning for the classified supercomputing environment. NNSA agreed with most of GAO's recommendations, but did not concur with recommendations relating to capacity planning and cost tracking.

Includes bibliographical references.

"GAO-11-67."

OCLC:

692880296