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Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan : a case study of adaptation in battle / Richard Kugler.

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Format:
Book
Government document
Author/Creator:
Kugler, Richard L.
Contributor:
Kugler, Richard L.
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy. Washington, DC.
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Series:
Case studies in national security transformation ; no. 5.
Case studies in national security transformation ; no. 5
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Operation Anaconda, 2002.
Afghan War, 2001-2021--Campaigns--Case studies.
Afghan War, 2001-2021.
Military planning--United States--Evaluation.
Military planning.
War on Terrorism, 2001-2009.
Unified operations (Military science).
Military campaigns.
Military planning--Evaluation.
United States.
Genre:
Case studies
Physical Description:
1 online resource (ii, 28 pages) : maps
Place of Publication:
[Washington, D.C.] : Center for Technology and National Security Policy, [2007]
Summary:
In his memoirs, "American Soldier," former U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Tommy Franks, USA, (Ret.) portrayed Operation Anaconda as an "absolute and unqualified success," but one in which the original U.S. military battle plan "didn't survive first contact with the enemy." General Franks' apt portrayal provides the framework for this case study of Operation Anaconda, which took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan during early March 2002. The goal of Operation Anaconda was to root out enemy Taliban and al Qaeda forces that had gathered in the valley following their earlier defeats in the first 3 months of the war. To achieve this goal, U.S. commanders crafted a complex and sophisticated battle plan involving a "hammer and anvil attack" by U.S. and friendly Afghan ground forces into the valley. This battle plan unraveled on the first day when enemy resistance proved fiercer than originally anticipated and friendly Afghan forces failed to carry out their march into the valley, thereby leaving deployed U.S. infantry forces to face the enemy alone. Success was achieved when U.S. forces switched tactical gears by calling on air strikes to work with the ground forces to suppress and destroy the enemy. Originally planned as a 3-day battle with light combat, Operation Anaconda turned out to be a 7-day battle with intense combat and was officially terminated only after 17 days. Operation Anaconda, which lasted from March 2-18, was successful because up to several hundred enemy fighters were killed and the rest fled the Shahikot Valley, leaving it in the control of U.S. and allied forces. U.S. casualties totaled eight military personnel killed and over 50 wounded. Success was achieved because the U.S. military showed a capacity to adapt by employing joint operations and modern information networks to surmount a surprising and difficult challenge. This paper recounts the battle's key features, its initial frustrations, and its ultimate success
Notes:
Title from title screen (viewed on December 2, 2009).
"February 2007."
The original document contains color images.
Includes bibliographical references.
OCLC:
227923773
Access Restriction:
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.

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