Tactical nuclear weapons : debunking the mythology / John T. Cappello, Gwendolyn M. Hall and Stephen P. Lambert.

Format:

Book

Government document

Author/Creator:

Cappello, John T.

Contributor:

Hall, Gwendolyn M.

Lambert, Stephen P.

USAF Institute for National Security Studies

Series:

INSS occasional paper ; 46.

INSS occasional paper ; 46

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Nuclear weapons.

Tactical nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons--Russia (Federation).

United States--Military relations--Russia (Federation).

United States.

Deterrence (Strategy).

Nuclear arms control.

Military relations.

Russia (Federation).

Physical Description:

1 online resource.

Place of Publication:

[Colorado Springs], Colo. : USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, [2002]

Summary:

This is the 46th volume in the Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). This paper review nuclear weapons and deterrence strategy in the post-Cold War world. In this project, the authors acknowledge the special psychological properties of nuclear weapons and the fact that detonation of any nuclear weapon, to include a tactical nuclear weapon, would be a "strategic"event. The paper reviews the many concerns attached to tactical nuclear systems over time, to include recent concerns about security surrounding the Russian stockpile. The authors propose that tactical nuclear forces be seen in the context of current and future security needs, and that the United States not limit its own security needs because of problems with the Russian arsenal. A recommendation to integrate all nuclear weapons into the U.S. nuclear framework is made to enhance deterrence and provide a credible response to a variety of threats to U.S. interests, and to continue the critical trans-Atlantic link between the United States and NATO. The paper concludes with four findings. The first finding acknowledges the lack of Russian incentive to engage in traditional arms control negotiations in any nuclear weapons category other than those in the strategic arena. This is primarily due to weaknesses in Russian conventional forces. Second, even if the Russians were motivated to do so, it is not in the interest of the United States or its allies to become entangled in further agreements on systems not previously captured in other treaties. Third, it is clear that for the future, other engagements aside from traditional arms control measures should be the solution for dealing with the Russian problem. Finally, the United States can enhance deterrence by integrating all U.S. nuclear weapons into a comprehensive nuclear posture.

Notes:

Title from title screen (viewed Feb. 24, 2003).

"August 2002."

Includes bibliographical references.

Other Format:

Cappello, John T. Tactical nuclear weapons : debunking the mythology

OCLC:

50622668