Insider threat study : computer system sabotage in critical infrastructure sectors / Michelle Keeney [and six others].

Format:

Book

Government document

Author/Creator:

Keeney, Michelle, author.

Contributor:

United States. Secret Service, issuing body.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Computer networks--Security measures--United States.

Computer networks.

Law enforcement--United States.

Law enforcement.

Computer networks--Security measures.

United States.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (45 pages)

Other Title:

Computer system sabotage in critical infrastructure sectors

Place of Publication:

Washington, DC : United States Secret Service, 2005.

Summary:

A new report from the Secret Service and the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute's CERT found that most acts of insider sabotage on computer systems in critical infrastructure sectors were perpetrated by former employees--motivated at least in part by a desire to seek revenge--who were granted system administrator or privileged access when hired.

Contents:

Introduction

Prevalence of incidents of insider sabotage

The insider threat study

Characteristics of insider sabotage across critical infrastructure sectors

Insider characteristics

Organization characteristics

Consequences to insiders

Key findings of the insider threat study of sabotage across critical infrastructure sectors

The insider's motive

Pre-attack behavior and planning

Advancing the attack

Detecting the attack

Consequences for targeted organizations

Implications of the key findings for the prevention of insider sabotage

Consequences for target organizations

Conclusion: Reflections on the findings for the prevention of insider sabotage.

Notes:

"May 2005."

Includes bibliographical references.

Descripton based on online resource; title from PDF cover (Secret Service website, viewed Feb. 9, 2021).

Publication from: United States Secret Service website.

OCLC:

70219144