The rational inquirer : disagreement, evidence, and the doxastic attitudes / Michele Palmira.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Palmira, Michele, author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Inquiry (Theory of knowledge).

Discussion.

Debates and debating.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (232 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2025]

Summary:

Disagreement is a pervasive feature of our intellectual lives. How should we respond to the problem of disagreement with someone whom we take to be our epistemic peer? Michele Palmira offers a framework for norms of inquiry according to which the rational response is to combine a process of double-checking with an attitude of hypothesis.

Contents:

Cover

Half Title

Title Page

Copyright Page

Dedication

Contents

Preface

Introduction

1 The Puzzle of Peer Disagreement

1 Introduction

2 Conformist Insight and Conformist Claim

3 Nonconformist Insight and Nonconformist Claim

4 A Puzzling Inconsistency

4.1 Epistemic peerhood

4.2 One-off vs systematic inquiries

4.3 Conformist vs nonconformist rationality

4.4 Individual vs collective rationality

5 Conclusions

2 Zeteticism

2 Preliminary Thoughts about Inquiry

3 What Is Double-Checking?

4 The Aim(s) of Inquiry

5 Norms of Inquiry

6 Conclusions

3 The Duty to Double-Check

2 Why Double-Check in the Face of HOE?

3 Testing the View

3.1 HOE after double-checking

3.2 Unimportant HOE

3.3 Multi-source HOE

3.4 Anti-circularity

4 Two Principles of Rational Inquiry and Rational Belief: A Zetetic Vindication of Conformist Claim

5 Zeteticism vs Defeatism vs Radical Evidentialism

5.1 Problems for defeat by bracketing

5.2 Problems for Level-Bridging

5.3 Why I Don't Go Radical (Evidentialist)

4 The Inquiry-Directing Attitude of Hypothesis

2 Phenomenology as a Starting Point

3 Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Hypothesis

3.1 Judgement and hypothesis

3.2 Suspended judgement and hypothesis

3.3 Doubt, supposition, and hypothesis

4 Inquiry Direction and Reasoning: Why Hypothesis Does Not Reduce to Credences

5 The Standing Attitude of Hypothesis

5 Rational Hypothesis

2 The Central Norm of Rational Hypothesis

3 Defending RationalH

4 Why be rational hypothesizers? Sketch of a genealogy

5 RationalH and non-ideal epistemic norms

6 Solving the Puzzle, Zetetic-Style

1 Introduction.

2 Duty to Double-Check, Suspended Judgement, and Hypothesis

3 The Zetetic Response to Peer Disagreement

4 How to Solve the Puzzle

5 Comparison with Competing Views

5.1 Independence-based Conciliationism

5.2 Acceptance

5.3 Conviction

5.4 Attitudinal speculation, inclination, endorsement, and transitional attitudes

5.5 The dynamic sustainability view

Concluding Remarks

Bibliography

Index.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on May 26, 2025).

ISBN:

0-19-892518-2

0-19-892516-6

OCLC:

1521112392