Buddhist physicalism? : non-self metaphysics and phenomenal consciousness / Mark Siderits.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Siderits, Mark, 1946- author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Buddhist philosophy.

Logical positivism.

Consciousness.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (235 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

New York : Oxford University Press, 2025.

Summary:

Could physicalism be compatible with Buddhist goals and practices? Mark Siderits considers a question that has the potential to altogether change our understanding of Buddhism. Buddhist Physicalism? is by necessity a work of fusion philosophy, a conversation between two distinct philosophical traditions. In drawing from the Buddhist philosophical tradition, as well as recent work in philosophy of mind, it attempts to mediate this conversation and answer two vexing questions in philosophy and Buddhism: might Buddhism be compatible with modern naturalism, and is consciousness something existing over and above the body and brain? Examining both Buddhist philosophy and practice, Siderits considers the privileged place of consciousness in Buddhist ontologies, exploring its compatibility with the sort of analysis and argumentation prevalent in the Buddhist tradition.

Contents:

Cover

Half Title

Title Page

Copyright Page

Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction: The Question Mark

1 Metaphysics and the Buddhist Project

1. The problem of suffering in the Nikāyas

2. The Buddha's diagnosis: the origins of suffering

3. Non-self

4. Persons as products of hypostatization

5. Early Buddhist dualism

2 Buddhist Metaphysical Scruples

1. Arguments for mereological nihilism

2. What is ultimately real?

3. The theory of two truths

4. Emergentism?

5. What is physicalism?

6. Buddhist dualist objections to physicalism

7. Buddhist idealist arguments against physicalism

8. Conclusion

3 Consciousness in Early Buddhism and the Abhidharma Schools

1. Consciousness in early Buddhism

2. Consciousness and metaphysical determinacy in Abhidharma

3. Some Abhidharma controversies concerning consciousness

4. Is there a suppressed dative in consciousness?

5. Conclusion

4 Meta-Cognition and the Reflexivity Thesis

1. Meta-cognition

2. The two-forms thesis

3. Dignāga's memory argument for the reflexivity thesis

4. Dharmakīrti's argument for the reflexivity thesis

5. Assessing Dignāga's argument from memory

6. The non-duality thesis

7. Solipsism

8. A Madhyamaka critique of reflexivity

5 Some Current Controversies Concerning Consciousness

1. Concepts of consciousness

2. Phenomenal consciousness

3. The "aware of being in it" requirement

4. Too many subjects?

6 Becoming Minded

1. The "I"-sense and the development of autobiographical memory

2. Executive function and time-travel

3. False belief and the asymmetry thesis

4. Transparency and meta-cognition

7 The Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness

1. Characterizing phenomenal consciousness

2. A theory of phenomenal consciousness.

3. A physicalist resolution of illusionism's hard problem

4. But is this a Buddhist illusionism?

8 Assessing the Plausibility of a Buddhist Physicalism

1. Is Buddhism possible without the karma-rebirth ideology?

2. Broader concerns about a Buddhism naturalized

3. Meditation as a Buddhist practice

4. Why not simply embrace Madhyamaka?

5. Conclusion: Why I am not a Buddhist physicalist

Abbreviations

Bibliography

Index.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on April 23, 2025).

ISBN:

0-19-779969-8

0-19-779967-1

0-19-779968-X

OCLC:

1517011023