My Account Log in

1 option

How Does Conditional Aid (Not) Work? / Rodney Ramcharan.

IMF eLibrary Available online

View online
Format:
Book
Government document
Author/Creator:
Ramcharan, Rodney.
Series:
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2002/183
IMF Working Papers
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource (26 pages)
Place of Publication:
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
Does policy conditionality worsen domestic welfare, as governments are forced to attempt unpopular reforms resulting in damaging protests, or does conditionality help implement reforms that otherwise would have been impossible? This paper analyzes these questions. Using a game-theoretic framework, it argues that the impact of conditional aid on welfare is nonmonotonic. Sufficiently conditioned aid can enhance the signaling power of reform announcements, thereby deterring protest and enabling reform. In contrast, inadequately conditioned aid may induce a "weak" government to mistakenly attempt reform, resulting in protest and a worsening of domestic welfare relative to the status quo.
Notes:
Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Description based on print version record.
ISBN:
9786613800435
9781462376087
1462376088
9781452756240
1452756244
9781282107083
1282107089
9781451904680
1451904681

The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.

Find

Home Release notes

My Account

Shelf Request an item Bookmarks Fines and fees Settings

Guides

Using the Find catalog Using Articles+ Using your account