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Public Disclosure and Bank Failures / Eduardo Levy Yeyati, Tito Cordella.

IMF eLibrary Available online

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Format:
Book
Government document
Author/Creator:
Levy Yeyati, Eduardo.
Contributor:
Cordella, Tito.
Series:
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 1997/096
IMF Working Papers
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource (25 pages)
Place of Publication:
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 1997.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
This paper examines how public disclosure of banks’ risk exposure affects banks’ risk-taking incentives and assesses how the presence of informed depositors influences the soundness of the banking system. It finds that, when banks have complete control over the volatility of their loan portfolios, public disclosure reduces the probability of banking crises. However, when banks do not control their risk exposure, the presence of informed depositors may increase the probability of bank failures.
Notes:
Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Description based on print version record.
ISBN:
9786613779526
9781462349951
1462349951
9781452732084
1452732086
9781281372178
128137217X
9781451897708
1451897707

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