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“Beneficial” Delays in Debt Restructuring Negotiations / Ran Bi.
- Format:
- Book
- Government document
- Author/Creator:
- Bi, Ran.
- Series:
- IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2008/038
- IMF Working Papers
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Debt relief--Econometric models.
- Debt relief.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (31 p.)
- Place of Publication:
- Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2008.
- Language Note:
- English
- Summary:
- Delays in debt restructuring negotiations are widely regarded as inefficient. This paper argues that delays can allow the economy to recover from a crisis, make more resources available for debt settlement, and enable the negotiating parties to enjoy a larger "cake". Within this context, therefore, delays may be "beneficial". This paper explores this idea by constructing a dynamic model of sovereign default in which debt renegotiation is modeled as a stochastic bargaining game based on Merlo and Wilson's (1995) framework. Quantitative analysis shows that this model can generate an average delay length comparable to that experienced by Argentina in its most recent debt restructuring.
- Contents:
- Contents; I. Introduction; Tables; 1. Cases of Sovereign Debt Restructurings; II. The Model; A. Sovereign Government's Problem; B. Debt Renegotiation Problem; C. International Investors' Problem; III. Equilibrium; IV. Quantitative Analysis; A. Calibration; 2. Model Parameter Values; B. Numerical Results on Equilibrium Properties; 3. Target Statistics and Model Statistics; Figures; 1. Equilibrium Default Probabilities; 2. Equilibrium Propose/Pass Choices of the Borrower and the Lender; 3. Equilibrium Debt Recovery Rates; 4. Proposed Debt Repayments; C. Simulation Results
- 5. Ergodic Distribution of the Equilibrium Delay Length4. Business Cycle Statistics from the Model and the Data; V. Determinants of Renegotiation Delay Length; A. Output Process and Equilibrium Delay Length; 5. Delay Lengths under Different Output Processes; B. Other Parameters and Renegotiation Delay Length; 6. Delay Lengths under Different Parameter Values; VI. Conclusion; Appendix; I. Proposition Proof; II. Computation Algorithm; References
- Notes:
- Description based upon print version of record.
- Includes bibliographical references.
- Description based on online resource; title from PDF cover (ebrary, viewed July 3, 2015).
- ISBN:
- 9786613821652
- 9781462328567
- 1462328563
- 9781452787435
- 1452787433
- 9781282456594
- 1282456598
- 9781451913538
- 1451913532
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