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Technology, Taxation, and Corruption : Evidence from the Introduction of Electronic Tax Filing / Okunogbe, Oyebola.
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (formerly "World Bank E-Library Publications") Available online
View online- Format:
- Book
- Government document
- Author/Creator:
- Okunogbe, Oyebola.
- Series:
- Policy research working papers.
- World Bank e-Library.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Corruption.
- De Facto Governments.
- Democratic Government.
- E-Government.
- Economic Adjustment and Lending.
- Electronic Tax Filing (E-Filing).
- Governance.
- International Economics and Trade.
- International Trade and Trade Rules.
- Law and Development.
- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.
- Public Sector Development.
- Tax Law.
- Taxation.
- Taxation and Subsidies.
- Technology.
- Local Subjects:
- Corruption.
- De Facto Governments.
- Democratic Government.
- E-Government.
- Economic Adjustment and Lending.
- Electronic Tax Filing (E-Filing).
- Governance.
- International Economics and Trade.
- International Trade and Trade Rules.
- Law and Development.
- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.
- Public Sector Development.
- Tax Law.
- Taxation.
- Taxation and Subsidies.
- Technology.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (62 pages)
- Other Title:
- Technology, Taxation, and Corruption
- Place of Publication:
- Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2018.
- System Details:
- data file
- Summary:
- Many e-government initiatives introduce technology to improve efficiency and avoid potential human bias. Electronic tax filing (e-filing) is an important example, as developing countries increasingly adopt online submission of tax declarations to replace in-person submission to tax officials. This paper examines the impact of e-filing on compliance costs, tax payments, and bribe payments using experimental variation and data from Tajikistan firms. Firms that e-file have lower compliance costs, spending five fewer hours each month on fulfilling tax obligations. There are no significant average effects of e-filing on tax or bribe payments, but significant heterogeneity exists across firms by their baseline likelihood of tax evasion. Among firms previously more likely to evade, e-filing doubles tax payments, likely by disrupting collusion with officials. Conversely, among firms less likely to have been evading, e-filing reduces tax payments, suggesting that officials had previously required them to pay more. These firms also pay fewer bribes, as e-filing reduces opportunity for extortion. In all, the results indicate that e-filing reduces compliance costs and makes the distribution of tax payments across firms arguably more equitable.
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