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Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies / Thorsten Beck.
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (formerly "World Bank E-Library Publications") Available online
View online- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Beck, Thorsten, author.
- Series:
- Policy research working papers (Online) 3043.
- Policy research working papers (Online) ; 3043
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Deposit insurance.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource.
- Other Title:
- Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution
- Place of Publication:
- Washington, D.C. : World Bank, 2003.
- Summary:
- Deposit insurance schemes and bank failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from bank runs; on the other hand, they are supposed to minimize aggressive risk taking by banks. Beck discusses the incentive-compatible design and interaction of both components of the financial safety net and describes and compares three countries with different safety net arrangements--Brazil, Germany, and Russia. This paper--a product of Finance, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the effects of deposit insurance and bank failure resolution.
- Notes:
- Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
- Publisher Number:
- 10.1596/1813-9450-3043
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