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Resistance to multilateral influence on reform : the political backlash against private infrastructure investments / Witold J. Henisz, Bennet A. Zelner.

World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (formerly "World Bank E-Library Publications") Available online

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Format:
Book
Government document
Author/Creator:
Henisz, Witold J.
Contributor:
World Bank.
Zelner, Bennet A.
Series:
Policy research working papers ; 3690.
World Bank e-Library.
Policy research working paper ; 3690
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Electric power--Case studies.
Electric power.
Infrastructure (Economics)--Case studies.
Infrastructure (Economics).
Loans, Foreign--Case studies.
Loans, Foreign.
Other Title:
Policy research working paper vol. 3690
Place of Publication:
[Washington, D.C. : World Bank, 2005]
System Details:
data file
Summary:
"Coercive isomorphism is a prominent source of institutional change. The literature to date has emphasized how actors that are powerful and legitimate (for example, a national government) may coerce the adoption of reforms by dependent actors (for example, state governments and other organizations whose activities are governed by the federal government). The authors observe that an actor's power alone may be sufficient to promote reform, regardless of the actor's legitimacy. But such reforms are more susceptible to subsequent change than those that emerge from processes not subject to the influence of external actors whose sway derives from their power alone. They develop and test their arguments in the context of the worldwide electricity provision industry by analyzing countries' adoption of reforms in response to conditional lending practices by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The authors find that reforms adopted in response to coercive pressures exerted by these organizations encounter much greater resistance, and that the incidence of financial and economic crises, the absence of checks and balances in established political institutions, and the inexperience of investor coalitions dramatically increase the predicted level of resistance. "--World Bank web site.
Notes:
Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/25/2005.
Includes bibliographical references.
Publisher Number:
10.1596/1813-9450-3690

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