1 option
Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence / Tito Cordella.
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (formerly "World Bank E-Library Publications") Available online
View online- Format:
- Book
- Government document
- Author/Creator:
- Cordella, Tito.
- Series:
- Policy research working papers.
- World Bank e-Library.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Aggregative Games.
- Conict.
- Natural Resources.
- Redistribution.
- Local Subjects:
- Aggregative Games.
- Conict.
- Natural Resources.
- Redistribution.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (36 pages)
- Place of Publication:
- Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2016.
- System Details:
- data file
- Summary:
- This paper investigates how the devolution of oil windfalls affects the likelihood of political violence. It shows that transferring large shares of oil wealth can prevent conflict, while transferring small shares can trigger it. Among the different transfer schemes, fiscal transfers (to subnational governments) yield the highest levels of consumption, but direct transfers (to people) are the most effective in preventing conflict. By averting conflict, transfers can improve ex ante welfare; however, only a subset of the ex ante welfare optimal transfers is optimal ex post and thus self-enforcing. Among them, those that avert conflict by reinforcing repressive regimes are of particular policy interest.
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.