Promises, Promises : Vote-Buying and the Electoral Mobilization Strategies of Non-Credible Politicians / Hanusch, Marek

Format:

Book

Government document

Author/Creator:

Hanusch, Marek

Contributor:

Hanusch, Marek

Keefer, Philip

Series:

Policy research working papers.

World Bank e-Library.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Civic Participation and Corporate Governance.

Electoral Mobilization Strategies.

Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.

Political Credibility.

Politics and Government.

Pre-Electoral Promises.

Vote-Buying.

Wages, Compensation & Benefits.

Local Subjects:

Civic Participation and Corporate Governance.

Electoral Mobilization Strategies.

Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.

Political Credibility.

Politics and Government.

Pre-Electoral Promises.

Vote-Buying.

Wages, Compensation & Benefits.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (38 pages)

Other Title:

Promises, Promises

Place of Publication:

Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2013

System Details:

data file

Summary:

Vote-buying is pervasive, but not everywhere. What explains significant variations across countries in the greater use of pre-electoral transfers to mobilize voters relative to the use of pre-electoral promises of post-electoral transfers? This paper explicitly models the trade-offs that politicians incur when they decide between mobilizing support with vote-buying or promises of post-electoral benefits. Politicians rely more on vote-buying when they are less credible, target vote-buying to those who do not believe their political promises, and only buy votes from those who would have received post-electoral transfers in a world of full political credibility. The enforcement of a prohibition on vote-buying reduces the welfare of those targeted with vote-buying, but improves the welfare of all other groups in society.