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Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives : How (and How Well) Do They Work? / Octavio Aburto-Oropeza.
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (formerly "World Bank E-Library Publications") Available online
View online- Format:
- Book
- Government document
- Author/Creator:
- Aburto-Oropeza, Octavio.
- Series:
- Policy research working papers.
- World Bank e-Library.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Agriculture.
- Cooperatives.
- Corporate Law.
- E-Business.
- Finance and Financial Sector Development.
- Fisheries.
- Fisheries & Aquaculture.
- Law and Development.
- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.
- Markets & Market Access.
- Natural Resources.
- Private Sector Development.
- Property Rights.
- Local Subjects:
- Agriculture.
- Cooperatives.
- Corporate Law.
- E-Business.
- Finance and Financial Sector Development.
- Fisheries.
- Fisheries & Aquaculture.
- Law and Development.
- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.
- Markets & Market Access.
- Natural Resources.
- Private Sector Development.
- Property Rights.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (58 pages)
- Other Title:
- Property Rights for Fishing Cooperatives
- Place of Publication:
- Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2016.
- System Details:
- data file
- Summary:
- Devolving property rights to local institutions has emerged as a compelling management strategy for natural resource management in developing countries. The use of property rights among fishing cooperatives operating in Mexico's Gulf of California provides a compelling setting for theoretical and empirical analysis. A dynamic theoretical model demonstrates how fishing cooperatives' management choices are shaped by the presence of property rights, the mobility of resources, and predictable environmental fluctuations. More aggressive management comes in the form of the cooperative leadership paying lower prices to cooperative members for their catch, as lower prices disincentivize fishing effort. The model's implications are empirically tested using three years of daily logbook data on prices and catches for three cooperatives from the Gulf of California. One cooperative enjoys property rights while the other two do not. There is empirical evidence in support of the model: compared to the other cooperatives, the cooperative with strong property rights pays members a lower price, pays especially lower prices for less mobile species, and decreases prices when environmental fluctuations cause population growth rates to fall. The results from this case study demonstrate the viability of cooperative management of resources but also point toward quantitatively important limitations created by the mismatch between the scale of a property right and the scale of a resource.
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