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Incomplete Contracts And Investment : A Study of Land Tenancy In Pakistan / Mansuri, Ghazala
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (formerly "World Bank E-Library Publications") Available online
View online- Format:
- Book
- Government document
- Author/Creator:
- Mansuri, Ghazala
- Series:
- Policy research working papers.
- World Bank e-Library.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Asymmetric Information.
- Bank Policy.
- Communities & Human Settlements.
- Contract.
- Contract Law.
- Contracts.
- Debt Markets.
- Economic Theory and Research.
- Economic Transactions.
- Exchange.
- Expropriation.
- Finance and Financial Sector Development.
- Financial Literacy.
- Investment.
- Investment and Investment Climate.
- Investment Behavior.
- Investment Decision.
- Investments.
- Investor.
- Labor Policies.
- Land and Real Estate Development.
- Law and Development.
- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.
- Market.
- Moral Hazard.
- Municipal Housing and Land.
- Political Economy.
- Principal-Agent Relationship.
- Private Sector Development.
- Property.
- Property Rights.
- Real Estate Development.
- Security.
- Share.
- Social Protections and Labor.
- Trading.
- Local Subjects:
- Asymmetric Information.
- Bank Policy.
- Communities & Human Settlements.
- Contract.
- Contract Law.
- Contracts.
- Debt Markets.
- Economic Theory and Research.
- Economic Transactions.
- Exchange.
- Expropriation.
- Finance and Financial Sector Development.
- Financial Literacy.
- Investment.
- Investment and Investment Climate.
- Investment Behavior.
- Investment Decision.
- Investments.
- Investor.
- Labor Policies.
- Land and Real Estate Development.
- Law and Development.
- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.
- Market.
- Moral Hazard.
- Municipal Housing and Land.
- Political Economy.
- Principal-Agent Relationship.
- Private Sector Development.
- Property.
- Property Rights.
- Real Estate Development.
- Security.
- Share.
- Social Protections and Labor.
- Trading.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (35 pages)
- Place of Publication:
- Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2006
- System Details:
- data file
- Summary:
- When contracts are incomplete, relationship-specific investments may be underprovided due to the threat of opportunistic expropriation or holdup. The authors find evidence of such underinvestment on tenanted land in rural Pakistan. Using data from households cultivating multiple plots under different tenure arrangements, they show that land-specific investment is lower on leased plots. This result is robust to the possible effects of asymmetric information in the leasing market. Greater tenure security also increases land-specific investment on leased plots. Moreover, variation in tenure security appears to be driven largely by heterogeneity across landlords, suggesting that reputation may be important in mitigating the holdup problem.
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