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International Lending, Sovereign Debt and Joint Liability : An Economic Theory Model for Amending the Treaty of Lisbon / Kaushik Basu

World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (formerly "World Bank E-Library Publications") Available online

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Format:
Book
Government document
Author/Creator:
Basu, Kaushik
Contributor:
Basu, Kaushik
Stiglitz, Joseph E.
Series:
Policy research working papers.
World Bank e-Library.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Access to Finance.
Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress.
Banks & Banking Reform.
Cross-country liability.
Debt Markets.
Economic Theory & Research.
Eurozone crisis.
Finance and Financial Sector Development.
International lending.
Joint liability.
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.
Sovereign debt.
Local Subjects:
Access to Finance.
Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress.
Banks & Banking Reform.
Cross-country liability.
Debt Markets.
Economic Theory & Research.
Eurozone crisis.
Finance and Financial Sector Development.
International lending.
Joint liability.
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.
Sovereign debt.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (31 pages)
Other Title:
International Lending, Sovereign Debt and Joint Liability
Place of Publication:
Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2013
System Details:
data file
Summary:
As the Eurozone crisis drags on, it is evident that a part of the problem lies in the architecture of debt and its liabilities within the Eurozone and, more generally, the European Union. This paper argues that a large part of the problem can be mitigated by permitting appropriately-structured cross-country liability for sovereign debt incurred by individual nations within the European Union. In brief, the paper makes a case for amending the Treaty of Lisbon. The case is established by constructing a game-theoretic model and demonstrating that there exist self-fulfilling equilibria, which would come into existence if cross-country debt liability were permitted and which are Pareto superior to the existing outcome.

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