1 option
Low-Level versus High-Level Equilibrium in Public Utility Services / Jon Strand
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (formerly "World Bank E-Library Publications") Available online
View online- Format:
- Book
- Government document
- Author/Creator:
- Strand, Jon
- Series:
- Policy research working papers.
- World Bank e-Library.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
- Economic Theory & Research.
- Effort Incentive Schemes.
- Energy.
- Environment.
- Low-Level Equilibrium.
- Multiple Equilibria.
- Political Economy.
- Public Sector Economics.
- Public Utility Services.
- Town Water Supply and Sanitation.
- Urban Water Supply and Sanitation.
- Local Subjects:
- Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
- Economic Theory & Research.
- Effort Incentive Schemes.
- Energy.
- Environment.
- Low-Level Equilibrium.
- Multiple Equilibria.
- Political Economy.
- Public Sector Economics.
- Public Utility Services.
- Town Water Supply and Sanitation.
- Urban Water Supply and Sanitation.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (33 pages)
- Place of Publication:
- Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2011
- System Details:
- data file
- Summary:
- Heterogeneity of public utility services is common in developing countries. In a "high-level" equilibrium, the quality of utility services is high, consumer willingness to pay for services is high, the utility is well funded and staff well paid in order to induce high quality of performance. In a "low-level" equilibrium the opposite is the case. Which alternative occurs depends on both the quality of utility management, and public perceptions about service quality. If a utility administration has the potential to offer high-quality service, and the public is aware of this, high-quality equilibrium also requires the public's service payments to be high enough to fund the needed pay incentives for the utility staff. When the public lack knowledge about the utility administration's quality, the public's initial beliefs about the utility administration's quality also will influence their willingness to make adequate service payments for a high-quality equilibrium. This paper shows that, with low confidence, only a low-level equilibrium may exist; while with higher initial confidence, a high-level equilibrium become possible. "Intermediate" (in between the low- and high-level) outcomes also can occur in early periods, with "high-level" outcomes later on.
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.