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High-Powered Incentives and Communication Failure / Mishra, Ajit
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (formerly "World Bank E-Library Publications") Available online
View online- Format:
- Book
- Government document
- Author/Creator:
- Mishra, Ajit
- Series:
- Policy research working papers.
- World Bank e-Library.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Education.
- Industry.
- Information and Communication Technologies.
- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.
- Social Protections and Labor.
- Local Subjects:
- Education.
- Industry.
- Information and Communication Technologies.
- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.
- Social Protections and Labor.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (30 pages)
- Place of Publication:
- Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2015
- System Details:
- data file
- Summary:
- This paper uses a donor-provider-agent framework to study the role of provider incentives for the delivery of developmental goods like aid, credit, or technology transfer to the poor. The paper considers a situation where credible communication by the provider is the key to successful delivery. The study shows that the use of high-powered incentives can lead to breakdown of communication between providers and agents, leading to undesirable outcomes. The paper studies the interplay between incentives and communication in the presence of typical and motivated providers and finds that in certain situations incentivization leads to worse outcomes.
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