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How adverse selection affects the health insurance market / Paolo Belli.
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (formerly "World Bank E-Library Publications") Available online
View online- Format:
- Book
- Government document
- Author/Creator:
- Belli, Paolo.
- Series:
- Policy research working papers ; 2574
- World Bank e-Library.
- Policy research working paper ; 2574
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Adverse selection (Insurance)--Mathematical models.
- Adverse selection (Insurance).
- Health insurance--Mathematical models.
- Health insurance.
- Managed care plans (Medical care)--Mathematical models.
- Managed care plans (Medical care).
- Other Title:
- Policy research working paper vol. 2574
- Place of Publication:
- Washington, D.C. : World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics, 2001.
- System Details:
- data file
- Summary:
- There may be a price to pay (in terms of inefficient coverage) if competition among health insurers is encouraged as a way to give patients greater choice and to achieve better control over insurance providers.
- Notes:
- "March 2001"--Cover.
- Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 13, 2002.
- Includes bibliographical references (p. 30-31).
- Publisher Number:
- 10.1596/1813-9450-2574
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