Democratization and clientelism : why are young democracies badly governed? / Philip Keefer.

Format:

Book

Government document

Author/Creator:

Keefer, Philip.

Contributor:

World Bank.

Series:

Policy research working papers ; 3594.

World Bank e-Library.

Policy research working paper ; 3594

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Democratization.

Patron and client.

Political corruption.

Other Title:

Policy research working paper vol. 3594

Place of Publication:

[Washington, D.C. : World Bank, 2005]

System Details:

data file

Summary:

"This paper identifies systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality, and lower secondary school enrollments; and spend more on public investment and government workers. Only one theory explains the effects of democratic age on the wide range of policy outcomes examined here-the inability of political competitors in younger democracies to make credible promises to citizens. This explanation, first advanced in Keefer and Vlaicu (2004), offers a concrete interpretation of what political institutionalization might mean, and why it is that young democracies frequently fail to become older and well-performing democracies. A variety of tests support this explanation against alternatives. The effect of democratic age remains large even after controlling for the possibilities that voters are less well-informed in young democracies, that young democracies have systematically different political and electoral institutions, or that young democracies exhibit more polarized societies. "--World Bank web site.

Notes:

Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/23/2005.

Includes bibliographical references.

Publisher Number:

10.1596/1813-9450-3594