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Asymmetric Punishment as an Instrument of Corruption Control / Karna Basu
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (formerly "World Bank E-Library Publications") Available online
View online- Format:
- Book
- Government document
- Author/Creator:
- Basu, Karna
- Series:
- Policy research working papers.
- World Bank e-Library.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Asymmetric Punishment.
- Bribery.
- Business Ethics Leadership and Value.
- Corruption.
- Corruption & Anticorruption Law.
- Crime and Society.
- Criminal Codes.
- Law and Development.
- Nash Bargaining.
- Private Sector Development.
- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measure.
- Public Sector Development.
- Social Accountability.
- Social Development.
- Local Subjects:
- Asymmetric Punishment.
- Bribery.
- Business Ethics Leadership and Value.
- Corruption.
- Corruption & Anticorruption Law.
- Crime and Society.
- Criminal Codes.
- Law and Development.
- Nash Bargaining.
- Private Sector Development.
- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measure.
- Public Sector Development.
- Social Accountability.
- Social Development.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (21 pages)
- Place of Publication:
- Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2014
- System Details:
- data file
- Summary:
- The control of bribery is a policy objective in many developing countries. It has been argued that asymmetric punishments could reduce bribery by incentivizing whistle-blowing. This paper investigates the role played by asymmetric punishment in a setting where bribe size is determined by Nash bargaining, detection is costly, and detection rates are set endogenously. First, when detection rates are fixed, the symmetry properties of punishment are irrelevant to bribery. Bribery disappears if expected penalties are sufficiently high; otherwise, bribe sizes rise as expected penalties rise. Second, when detection rates are determined by the bribe-giver, a switch from symmetric to asymmetric punishment either eliminates bribery or allows it to persist with larger bribe sizes. Furthermore, when bribery persists, multiple bribe sizes could survive in equilibrium. The paper derives parameter values under which each of these outcomes occurs and discusses how these could be interpreted in the context of existing institutions.
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