Auctions with endogenous participation and quality thresholds : evidence from oda infrastructure procurement / Antonio Estache, Atsushi Iimi.

Format:

Book

Government document

Author/Creator:

Estache, Antonio.

Contributor:

World Bank.

Iimi, Atsushi.

Series:

Policy research working papers ; 4853.

World Bank e-Library.

Policy research working paper ; 4853

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Economic development--Social aspects.

Economic development.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (38 pages).

Other Title:

Policy research working paper vol. 4853

Place of Publication:

[Washington, D.C. : World Bank, 2009]

System Details:

data file

Summary:

"Infrastructure projects are often technically complicated and highly customized. Therefore, procurement competition tends to be limited. Competition is the single most important factor toward auction efficiency and anti-corruption. However, the degree of competition realized is closely related to bidders' entry decision and the auctioneer's decision on how to assess technical attributes in the bid evaluation process. This paper estimates the interactive effects among quality, entry, and competition. With data on procurement auctions for electricity projects in developing countries, it is found that large electricity works are by nature costly and can attract only a few participants. The limited competition would raise government procurement costs. In addition, high technical requirements are likely to be imposed for these large-scale projects, which will in turn add extra costs for the better quality of works and further limit bidder participation. The evidence suggests that quality is of particular importance in large infrastructure projects and auctioneers cannot easily substitute price for quality. "--World Bank web site.

Notes:

Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/8/2009.

Includes bibliographical references.

Publisher Number:

10.1596/1813-9450-4853