Bank supervision and corporate finance / Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Ross Levine.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Beck, Thorsten.

Contributor:

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Demirguc-Kunt, Asli.

Levine, Ross.

Series:

Policy research working papers ; 3042.

World Bank e-Library.

Policy research working paper ; 3042

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Other Title:

Policy research working paper vol. 3042

Place of Publication:

Washington, D.C. : World Bank, [2003]

System Details:

data file

Summary:

We examine the impact of bank supervision on the financing obstacles faced by almost 5,000 corporations across 49 countries. We find that firms in countries with strong official supervisory agencies that directly monitor banks tend to face greater financing obstacles. Moreover, powerful official supervision tends to increase firm reliance on special connections and corruption in raising external finance, which is consistent with political/regulatory capture theories. Creating a supervisory agency that is independent of the government and banks mitigates the adverse consequences of powerful supervision. Finally, we find that bank supervisory agencies that force accurate information disclosure by banks and enhance private monitoring tend to ease the financing obstacles faced by firms.

Notes:

Print version record

April 2003.

Includes bibliographical references.

Publisher Number:

10.1596/1813-9450-3042