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Climate Change and Trade Policy : From Mutual Destruction To Mutual Support / Messerlin, Patrick A.
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (formerly "World Bank E-Library Publications") Available online
View online- Format:
- Book
- Government document
- Author/Creator:
- Messerlin, Patrick A.
- Series:
- Policy research working papers.
- World Bank e-Library.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Aluminum.
- Carbon.
- Carbon emissions.
- Carbon policies.
- Carbon Policy and Trading.
- Carbon tax.
- Carbon taxes.
- Chemicals.
- Climate.
- Climate change.
- Climate Change Economics.
- Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases.
- Co2.
- Debt Markets.
- Domestic carbon.
- Emerging Markets.
- Emission.
- Emission cuts.
- Environment.
- Finance and Financial Sector Development.
- Greenhouse.
- Greenhouse gases.
- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.
- Precautionary approach.
- Private Sector Development.
- Renewable energy.
- Sulfur.
- Sulfur dioxide.
- Temperature.
- Local Subjects:
- Aluminum.
- Carbon.
- Carbon emissions.
- Carbon policies.
- Carbon Policy and Trading.
- Carbon tax.
- Carbon taxes.
- Chemicals.
- Climate.
- Climate change.
- Climate Change Economics.
- Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases.
- Co2.
- Debt Markets.
- Domestic carbon.
- Emerging Markets.
- Emission.
- Emission cuts.
- Environment.
- Finance and Financial Sector Development.
- Greenhouse.
- Greenhouse gases.
- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.
- Precautionary approach.
- Private Sector Development.
- Renewable energy.
- Sulfur.
- Sulfur dioxide.
- Temperature.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (35 pages)
- Other Title:
- Climate Change And Trade Policy
- Place of Publication:
- Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2010
- System Details:
- data file
- Summary:
- Contrary to what is still often believed, the climate and trade communities have a lot in common: a common problem (a global "public good"), common foes (vested interests using protection for slowing down climate change policies), and common friends (firms delivering goods, services, and equipment that are both cleaner and cheaper). They have thus many reasons to buttress each other. The climate community would enormously benefit from adopting the principle of "national treatment," which would legitimize and discipline the use of carbon border tax adjustment and the principle of "most-favored nation," which would ban carbon tariffs. The main effect of this would be to fuel a dual world economy of clean countries trading between themselves and dirty countries trading between themselves at a great cost for climate change. And the trade community would enormously benefit from a climate community capable of designing instruments that would support the adjustment efforts to be made by carbon-intensive firms much better than instruments such as antidumping or safeguards, which have proved to be ineffective and perverse. That said, implementing these principles will be difficult. The paper focuses on two key problems. First, the way carbon border taxes are defined has a huge impact on the joint outcome from climate change, trade, and development perspectives. Second, the multilateral climate change regime could easily become too complex to be manageable. Focusing on carbon-intensive sectors and building "clusters" of production processes considered as having "like carbon-intensity" are the two main ways for keeping the regime manageable. Developing them in a multilateral framework would make them more transparent and unbiased.
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