1 option
The Newly Unemployed and the UIF Take-up Rate : Implications for the Wage Subsidy Proposal in South Africa. / Haroon Bhorat.
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (formerly "World Bank E-Library Publications") Available online
View online- Format:
- Book
- Government document
- Author/Creator:
- Bhorat, Haroon.
- Series:
- Other papers
- World Bank e-Library.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Climate.
- Employment Opportunities.
- Financial Crisis.
- Gdp.
- Human Capital.
- Human Resources.
- Informal Sector.
- Insolvency.
- Job Creation.
- Labor Market.
- Labor Markets.
- Labor Policies.
- Labor Relations.
- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.
- Moral Hazard.
- Older Workers.
- Political Economy.
- Private Sector.
- Productivity.
- Skilled Workers.
- Social Protections and Labor.
- Taxation & Subsidies.
- Unemployment.
- Unemployment Insurance Benefits.
- Working Poor.
- Younger Workers.
- Local Subjects:
- Climate.
- Employment Opportunities.
- Financial Crisis.
- Gdp.
- Human Capital.
- Human Resources.
- Informal Sector.
- Insolvency.
- Job Creation.
- Labor Market.
- Labor Markets.
- Labor Policies.
- Labor Relations.
- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth.
- Moral Hazard.
- Older Workers.
- Political Economy.
- Private Sector.
- Productivity.
- Skilled Workers.
- Social Protections and Labor.
- Taxation & Subsidies.
- Unemployment.
- Unemployment Insurance Benefits.
- Working Poor.
- Younger Workers.
- Other Title:
- Newly Unemployed and the UIF Take-up Rate
- Place of Publication:
- Washington, D.C. : The World Bank, 2011.
- System Details:
- data file
- Summary:
- This paper investigates the take-up rate or claim-waiting period rate of the unemployed under the South African Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) system. The goal is to identify disincentive effects that income replacement rates (IRR) and accumulated credits may have on the claimant's behavior in terms of their claim waiting period rate (or how quickly they apply for UIF benefits). Utilizing nonparametric and semi-parametric estimation techniques, we find that there is little evidence, if any, for job disincentives or moral hazard problems. More specifically, the majority of claimants that are quickest to claim the UIF benefits are those who have worked continuously for at least four years and accumulated the maximum allowable amount of credits. The authors also note that claimants' waiting periods are indifferent with regard to levels of income replacements yet extremely sensitive to the amount of credits accumulated. Ultimately, the recipients of the UIF benefits do not rely heavily on the replacement incomes and prefer waiting longer for employment opportunities as opposed to exhausting their accumulated credits. The semi-parametric Cox's Proportional Hazard (PH) model confirms that there is a positive relationship between the claimant's accumulation of credits and the associated take-up rate of the UIF.
The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.