The Missing Keystone of Income Tax Treaties.

Format:

• Book
• Thesis/Dissertation

Author/Creator:

• Wheeler, Joanna.

Series:

• Doctoral series, 1570-7164 ; v. 23.
• IBFD doctoral series, 1570-7164 ; v. 23

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

• Double taxation--Treaties.

Physical Description:

xiv, 434 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Amsterdam : IBFD Publications USA, Incorporated, 2012.

Summary:

This book suggests a new structure for the OECD Model to eliminate a fundamental flaw which underlies many current problems in respect of entitlement to treaty benefits.

Contents:

• Intro
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Acknowledgements
• Table of Contents
• Chapter 1: Introduction
• Chapter 2: Issues and Solutions within the Current Treaty Framework
• 2.1. Introduction
• 2.2. The treaty claimant
• 2.3. Residence
• 2.3.1. The general definition - unlimited liability to tax
• 2.3.2. Tax-exempt persons
• 2.3.3. Liability to which tax?
• 2.3.4. The policy behind the residence requirement
• 2.3.5. Conclusion
• 2.4. Attribution of income
• 2.4.1. Domestic law
• 2.4.2. The OECD Model
• 2.4.3. Beneficial ownership
• 2.4.4. Partnership Report principles
• 2.4.5. Concluded treaties
• 2.4.6. Conclusion
• Chapter 3: Fundamental Issues with the Current Structure of Treaties
• 3.1. Introduction
• 3.2. Subjective/objective nature of treaties
• 3.2.1. OECD Model
• 3.2.2. Economic double taxation - the subjective or objective nature of the treaty distributive rules
• 3.2.3. Vicarious treaty benefits
• 3.2.4. Conclusion
• 3.3. Liability to tax on a specific item of income
• 3.3.1. Liability to tax on specific income as a negative factor
• 3.3.2. Liability to tax on specific income as a positive factor
• 3.3.3. Separation of ownership and tax liability
• 3.3.4. Multiple attributions - or none
• 3.3.5. Role of attribution in treaty entitlement
• 3.4. Conclusion - the missing keystone
• Chapter 4: A New Approach
• 4.1. Introduction
• 4.1.1. The new approach in outline
• 4.1.2. Supporting factors - margins of discretion
• 4.2. The treaty claimant
• 4.2.1. In general
• 4.2.2. Permanent establishments
• 4.3. Liability to tax
• 4.3.1. The basic principle
• 4.3.2. The sufficiency of the tax liability
• 4.3.3. Fragmented and dislocated tax liability
• 4.4. The supporting factors in the residence state
• 4.4.1. The connection between the income and the person.
• 4.4.2. The connection between the person and the state
• 4.4.3. Business receipts
• 4.5. Treaty protection without liability to tax
• 4.5.1. Tax-exempt persons and income
• 4.5.2. Potential liability to tax
• 4.6. The residence state
• 4.7. Attribution conflicts in the new approach
• 4.7.1. Hierarchy of attributions
• 4.7.2. The triangular case
• 4.7.3. Source and residence state attributions
• 4.7.4. Permanent establishments
• 4.7.5. Double attribution within one state
• 4.8. Fragmented treaty entitlement
• 4.8.1. Separation of direct ownership and tax liability
• 4.8.2. Fragments within one state
• 4.8.3. Fragments in different states
• 4.9. Artificial ownership structures
• 4.9.1. Introduction
• 4.9.2. Conduit structures
• 4.9.3. Base erosion
• 4.9.4. Identification of the target structures
• 4.9.5. Solutions
• Chapter 5: The New Approach Applied
• 5.1. Flow-through situations
• 5.1.1. Case 4600
• 5.1.2. Ruling 17 of 2006
• 5.1.3. Diebold case
• 5.2. Double attributions
• 5.2.1. Aznavour case
• 5.2.1.1. The actual decision
• 5.2.1.2. The new approach
• 5.2.2. Russell case and Willoughby case
• 5.2.2.1. The actual decisions
• 5.2.2.2. The new approach applied to the Russell and Willoughby cases
• 5.2.2.3. The further consequences of the new approach in the Russell case
• 5.2.3. Padmore case
• 5.2.3.1. The actual decision
• 5.2.3.2. The new approach
• 5.2.4. Smallwood case
• 5.2.4.1. The actual decision
• 5.2.4.2. The new approach
• 5.2.5. Bayfine case
• 5.2.6. CFC and comparable regimes
• 5.3. Fragmented treaty entitlement
• 5.3.1. Fragmentation within one state
• 5.3.1.1. TD Securities case
• 5.3.1.2. S-corporation case
• 5.3.1.3. Linklaters case
• 5.3.2. Cross-border fragmentation
• 5.3.2.1. BNB 1990/45
• 5.3.2.2. The new approach
• 5.3.3. Other fragmentations
• 5.4. Trusts.
• 5.4.1. Introduction
• 5.4.2. Different domestic systems
• 5.4.2.1. Representative liability
• 5.4.2.2. Initial choice system
• 5.4.2.3. Credit system
• 5.4.2.4. Deduction system
• 5.4.3. Treaty entitlement of trustees
• 5.4.4. Settlor taxation
• Chapter 6: Conclusion
• 6.1. The problems with the current approach
• 6.2. The new approach
• 6.2.1. The essence of the new approach
• 6.2.2. Issues with the new approach
• 6.3. The way forward
• Appendix I: Draft Treaty Text and Commentary
• Appendix II: Domestic Law of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in Respect of the Attribution of Income to a Person
• 1. Introduction
• 1.1. The aim of this study
• 1.2. The scope of the study
• 1.3. Structure of the study
• 2. Basic principles in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
• 2.2. The Netherlands
• 2.3. The United Kingdom
• 2.3.1. Background
• 2.3.2. Attribution criteria
• 3. Income from assets
• 3.1. The importance of ownership
• 3.1.1. Gains from the disposal of an asset
• 3.1.2. Income from an asset
• 3.1.2.1. The Netherlands
• 3.1.2.2. The United Kingdom
• 3.1.3. Contractual arrangements
• 3.2. Divided ownership
• 3.2.1. Trusts
• 3.2.1.1. The trust concept
• 3.2.1.2. Taxation in the United Kingdom - basic principles
• 3.2.1.3. Taxation in the United Kingdom - further consideration
• 3.2.1.4. Taxation in the Netherlands
• 3.2.2. Usufruct
• 3.2.3. Economic ownership
• 3.2.3.1. The Netherlands
• 3.2.3.2. The United Kingdom
• 3.2.3.3. Beneficial ownership in the United Kingdom
• 3.3. Short-term ownership of shares
• 3.3.1. Case law responses
• 3.3.2. Netherlands legislative response
• 3.3.3. UK legislative response
• 3.4. Indirect ownership and ownership equivalents
• 3.4.1. The Netherlands
• 3.4.1.1. Certification of shares
• 3.4.1.2. Interposed companies
• 3.4.1.3. Foundations.
• 3.4.2. The United Kingdom
• 3.4.2.1. Capital gains
• 3.4.2.2. Recurrent income - CFC regime and "transfer of assets abroad" scheme
• 3.5. Separation of income from the asset
• 3.5.1. Gift of income
• 3.5.1.1. The Netherlands
• 3.5.1.2. The United Kingdom
• 3.5.2. Sale of income
• 3.5.2.1. The Netherlands
• 3.5.2.2. The United Kingdom
• 4. Active income
• 4.1. Employment income
• 4.1.1. Payment to a person other than the employee
• 4.1.1.1. The Netherlands
• 4.1.1.2. The United Kingdom
• 4.1.2. Alienation of employment income
• 4.1.3. Personal companies (disguised employment)
• 4.1.3.1. The Netherlands
• 4.1.3.2. The United Kingdom
• 4.2. Business profit
• 4.2.1. Basic approaches
• 4.2.2. The importance of carrying on the business
• 4.2.3. Enabling another person to make a business profit
• 4.2.4. Carrying on a business in order to benefit another person
• 4.2.5. Shifting business profit
• 4.2.5.1. The Netherlands
• 4.2.5.2. The United Kingdom
• 4.2.6. Integrated businesses
• 4.2.6.1. The Netherlands
• 4.2.6.2. The United Kingdom
• 4.2.6.3. Comparison
• 5. Factors in the attribution of income
• 5.1. Legal entitlement
• 5.1.1. Introduction
• 5.1.2. The Netherlands
• 5.1.2.1. Dividend tax
• 5.1.2.2. Employment income
• 5.1.2.3. Other categories of income
• 5.1.3. The United Kingdom
• 5.1.3.1. Capital gains tax and corporation tax
• 5.1.3.2. Income tax
• 5.2. Economic entitlement
• 5.2.1. Introduction
• 5.2.2. The Netherlands
• 5.2.2.1. Dividend tax
• 5.2.2.2. General principle
• 5.2.2.3. Whose benefit?
• 5.2.3. The United Kingdom
• 5.2.3.1. Capital gains tax and corporation tax
• 5.2.3.2. Income tax
• 5.2.3.3. Whose benefit?
• 5.3. Receipt
• 5.3.1. Introduction
• 5.3.2. What is receipt?
• 5.3.2.1. What is a payment?
• 5.3.2.2. Indirect receipt
• 5.3.2.3. Constructive receipt.
• 5.3.3. Receipt as an attribution factor
• 5.3.3.1. The Netherlands
• 5.3.3.2. The United Kingdom
• 5.4. Control
• 5.4.1. Introduction
• 5.4.2. Control over the creation of income
• 5.4.3. Control over the selection of beneficiaries
• 5.4.4. Control over assets
• 5.4.5. Control over the application of income
• 5.4.5.1. Whether there is taxable income
• 5.4.5.2. Control over application as an attribution factor
• 5.4.5.3. Structural limits on control over the application of income
• 5.4.5.4. Obligations attached to income
• 5.5. Alienation of income
• 5.5.1. Which types of income can be alienated?
• 5.5.2. When is alienation effective for tax purposes?
• 5.5.2.1. General requirements
• 5.5.2.2. Sale of income - the relevance of the sale price
• 5.5.2.3. Alienation of a stream of income or of a specific payment of income
• 5.5.3. Does an obligation to pay income amount to alienation?
• 5.5.3.1. The Netherlands
• 5.5.3.2. The United Kingdom
• 6. Taxable persons
• 6.1. Introduction
• 6.2. No taxable person
• 6.2.1. The Netherlands
• 6.2.1.1. General principle
• 6.2.1.2. Dividend tax
• 6.2.2. The United Kingdom
• 6.3. More than one taxable person
• 6.3.1. The Netherlands
• 6.3.2. The United Kingdom
• 6.3.2.1. Introduction
• 6.3.2.2. Anti-avoidance legislation
• 6.3.2.3. General attribution rule
• 6.3.2.4. Basic rate and higher rates of income tax
• 7. Conclusion
• 7.1. Similarities and differences
• 7.2. Attribution factors
• 7.3. The difficulty of defining attribution principles
• 7.4. A final word on the international dimension
• Summary
• Bibliography
• Table of Cases
• Table of Legislation and Official Documents.

Notes:

• Thesis (doctoral)--University of Amsterdam, 2012.
• Includes bibliographical references (p. 393-409).
• Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

90-8722-124-X

OCLC:

793210036