Oxford studies in metaethics. Volume 20 / edited by Russ Shafer-Landau.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Shafer-Landau, Russ, editor.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Metaethics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (349 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Other Title:

Studies in metaethics

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2025]

Summary:

'Oxford Studies in Metaethics' is devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field.

Contents:

Cover

Half Title

Title Page

Copyright Page

Contents

List of Contributors

Introduction

1 Moral Worth: You Can't Have It Both Ways

Huck Finn Cases: A Few Clarifications

The Argument: Part One

Why the Symmetry?

The Argument: Part 2 (Plus a Sequel)

Is There Honest Moral Ignorance?

Partial Credit?

It Depends?

References

2 Changing Minds and Hearts

1 Introduction

2 The Pessimist's Argument: Moral Testimony and Affective Alienation

3 Hermeneutical Advice as Transmitting Perspectives

4 What Are Moral Perspectives?

5 Hermeneutical Advice in Conversation

6 Hermeneutical Advice and Epistemic Authority

7 Conclusion

Bibliography

3 A Theory of Prudential Alienation

2 The Alienation Constraint

3 How to Build a (Good) Theory of Prudential Alienation

3.1 Choice Points

3.2 Desiderata

4 Three Kinds of Alienation

4.1 Affective Alienation

4.2 Desiderative Alienation

4.3 Cognitive Alienation

5 Unqualified Alienation

5.1 The Compensation Hypothesis

5.2 The Detraction Hypothesis

6 The Interaction Theory

Acknowledgements

4 Non-Ardent Non-Naturalism

2 Non-Ardent Non-Naturalism

3 Authoritative Prescriptivity and the Mackiean Intuition

4 Objections and Replies

5 Explaining Open Question Intuitions

1

2

3

4

5

6

6 The Metaethical Presuppositions of Conceptual Engineering

1 Conceptual Engineering: A Very Brief History

2 Criteria for a Metasemantic Theory of Conceptual Engineering

2.1 The Metasemantic Control Challenge

2.2 Making Sense of the Method

2.3 Ameliorative Reports and the Structure of Ameliorative Arguments

2.4 Summing Up the Criteria

3 Interest-Relative Metasemantics: Ameliorative Pragmatism.

4 Substantively Normative Metasemantics

4.1 Initial Motivations

4.2 Two Approaches to Normative-Metasemantic Entanglement

4.2.1 Normative Reference Magnets

4.2.2 Connectedness + Normative Idealization

5 Normative-Metasemantic Entanglement and the Three Criteria

6 Shared Content and Metanormative Commitments

7 An Objection, a Response, and an Implication

8 Conclusion

Works Cited

7 Thick Facts

1 Thick Concepts and Thick Terms

2 The Thick Concept Argument

3 More Sophisticated Analyses, and the Pragmatic View

3.1 More Sophisticated Analyses

3.2 The Pragmatic View

4 Against Embedded Evaluation

5 A New Thick Term Argument

6 Real Similarities and 'Going On in the Same Way'

7 Further Objections and Replies

7.1 Against P3

7.2 Against P9 and C

7.3 Objectionable Thick Terms

8 Rationality Reunified

1 Ground-Clearing

1.1 Monism vs. Dualism

1.2 Correctness

2 Substantive Rationality

3 Structural Rationality

3.1 Worsnip and Brunero

3.2 Guaranteed Incorrectness: Easier Cases

3.3 Guaranteed Incorrectness: Harder Cases

3.3.1 Cyclical Preferences

3.3.2 Inter-level Coherence

4 Rationality Reunified

5 Concluding Remarks: Commitment and the Normativity of Rationality

9 Against Subscripted Reasons

1 Types of Subscription

2 A Parfitian Skepticism

3 Weight

4 Function

5 Content

6 Explanation

7 Conclusion and Further Ruminations

10 Value-Based Reasons

1 Preliminaries

2 The Intelligibility Requirement

3 The Guidance Condition

3.1 GC and Surprise Parties

3.2 GC and 'Reason Implies Can'

3.3 GC's Role

3.4 GC and Value-Based Reasons

4 The Value of the Action

4.1 Too Many Surprise Parties!

5 Paradigm and Variation

11 Runaway Reasons.

1 Introduction

2 Fittingness and Reasons

3 McHugh and Way's Reasoning Account of Reasons

4 A Linking Principle

5 The Normativity of Fittingness

6 The Possibility of Runaway Reasons

7 The Runaway Reasons Problem

8 Concluding Remarks

12 Normativity as Reactive Shield

1 Normativity, What

2 Introducing the Reactive Construal

2.1 Identifying the Constitutive Norms

2.2 The Official Formulation of the Reactive Construal

3 Plausibility

3.1 The Third Desideratum: Extensional Fit

3.2 The First Desideratum

3.3 The Second Desideratum

4 Defending Parity

5 Isn't the Reactive Construal Mere Sociology?

Index.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on April 8, 2025).

ISBN:

0-19-895810-2

0-19-895808-0

OCLC:

1513828964