Leaving nothing to chance : equality as luck neutralization / Carl Knight.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Knight, Carl, author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Equality--Philosophy.

Equality.

Distributive justice--Philosophy.

Distributive justice.

Fortune--Social aspects.

Fortune.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (284 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2025]

Summary:

This text argues that equality consists in the neutralization of luck. It shows that it is not only unfair for people to be worse off due to their class, sex, or race, but unfair for them to be worse off due to bad luck in how their choices work out.

Contents:

Cover

Half Title

Title Page

Copyright Page

Dedication

Contents

Preface

Acknowledgements

Tables

1 LEAVING NOTHING TO CHANCE

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Luck neutralization

1.3 Luck prioritarianism

1.4 Distributive justice

1.5 Method

1.6 Outline of the book

1.7 Conclusion

PART I AGENCY

2 WHY LUCK EGALITARIANISM?

2.1 Introduction

2.2 The intuitive argument

2.3 The agency argument

2.4 Objections

2.5 Egalitarian alternatives

2.6 The utilitarian alternative

2.7 Conclusion

3 THE GREY BOX OF RESPONSIBILITY

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Black box responsibilitarianism

3.3 Opening the box I: non-distributive, non-punitive compatibilism

3.4 Opening the box II: socially regulative compatibilism

3.5 Opening the box III: restricted socially regulative compatibilism

3.6 Conclusion

4 WHAT MATTERS FOR EGALITARIANS

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Identity and justice

4.3 Is identity what matters?

4.4 How problems with identity are problems for luck egalitarians

4.5 The thin theory of what matters

4.6 How luck egalitarianism should respond to what matters

4.7 Prudence and morality

4.8 Conclusion

PART II OPTION LUCK

5 DOMINANT GAMBLES

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Dominant gambles

5.3 The dominant gamble view

5.4 The reasonable avoidability view

5.5 The quasi-gamble view

5.6 Conclusion

6 THE NO FAULT OR CHOICE PRINCIPLE

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Fault

6.3 Choice I: prudential brute-luck egalitarianism

6.4 Choice II: moral brute-luck egalitarianism

6.5 Revised brute-luck egalitarianism

6.6 Conclusion

7 ALL-LUCK EGALITARIANISM

7.1 Introduction

7.2 What is all-luck egalitarianism?

7.3 An argument for all-luck egalitarianism

7.4 Risk pooling

7.5 Probabilities

7.6 Prudence and morality revisited

7.7 Scarcity and surplus.

7.8 Brute luck

7.9 Conclusion

PART III OBJECTIONS

8 OBJECTIONS TO ALL-LUCK EGALITARIANISM

8.1 Introduction

8.2 Inefficiency

8.3 Imposition of externalities on non-risk-takers

8.4 Unequal treatment of risk-takers as a whole

8.5 Unequal treatment of specific risk-takers

8.6 Lack of intuitive support

8.7 A desertist theory?

8.8 Conclusion

9 THE ABANDONMENT OBJECTION

9.1 Introduction

9.2 The empirical argument

9.3 The sufficiency argument

9.4 The domain argument

9.5 The equality argument

9.6 The identity argument

9.7 The option-luck argument

9.8 The free will argument

9.9 Gross negligence and malevolence

9.10 Conclusion

References

Index.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on February 27, 2025).

ISBN:

0-19-894570-1

0-19-894568-X

OCLC:

1503438258