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Political Control Over Redistricting and the Partisan Balance in Congress / Kenneth Coriale, Daniel A. Kolliner, Ethan Kaplan.

NBER Working papers Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Coriale, Kenneth.
Contributor:
Kolliner, Daniel A.
Kaplan, Ethan.
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Series:
Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w33801.
NBER working paper series no. w33801
Language:
English
Physical Description:
1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
Place of Publication:
Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2025.
Summary:
We estimate the impact of a political party's ability to unilaterally redistrict Congressional seats upon partisan seat share allocations in the U.S. House of Representatives. Controlling for stateXdecade and year effects, we find an 8.2 percentage point increase in the Republican House seat share in the three elections following Republican control over redistricting in the 2000 and 2010 redistricting cycles. We only find significant effects for Democrats in large states. Effects are one half of the average seat gap between the parties in the 2010s. Differences across parties reflect more denied trifectas due to an opposite party governor in Democratic states and greater impacts for Republicans in small states. Differences do not reflect a rise in racial gerrymandering.
Notes:
May 2025.
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