The material mind : reduction and emergence / Max Kistler.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kistler, Max, author.

Series:

BSPS Open Series

BSPS Open Series ; v.3

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Emergence (Philosophy).

Materialism.

Mind and body.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (308 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Calgary, Alberta : University of Calgary Press, [2025]

Summary:

The Material Mind develops a concept of reduction that is compatible both with scientific change and with the possibility of multiple reduction bases. It shows that cognitive and other higher-level properties can be construed as causal powers, develops a concept of emergence compatible with reduction, and shows that the integration of the mind into a scientific conception of the world does not deprive mental properties and events of causal efficiency. The book defends the possibility of downward causation of physiological effects by cognitive causes, by questioning the justification of both the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and the principle of causal-explanatory exclusion.

Contents:

Front Cover

Half Title Page

Series Page

Full Title Page

Copyright Page

Contents

List of Figures

Foreword and Acknowledgements

Introduction

1 | Unity of Science and Reduction

1. Introduction

2. Deductive and Ontological Unification

3. The Deductive-Nomological Model of Reduction

4. The Model of Reduction by Analogy

5. The Reduction of Thermodynamics to Classical Mechanics

6. The Synthetic Model of Reduction

7. The Reduction of Cognitive Phenomena by Neurophysiology: Elimination or Co-Evolution?

8. Conclusion

2 | Can Reductive Explanations Be Constructed A Priori?

2. A Priori Reduction in the Framework of Two-Dimensional Semantics

3. Two Concepts of Reduction and Realization: Micro-Macro and Role-Occupant

4. Multi-Realizability

5. Conclusion

3 | Cognitive Abilities as Macroscopic Dispositional Properties

2. General Arguments against the Efficacy of Dispositions

3. Dispositional and Theoretical Properties

4. The Epiphenomenal Trilemma of Macroscopic Dispositions

5. The Example of Colour Representation

6. Dispositional Properties with Multiple Manifestations

7. Conclusion

4 | Emergent Properties

2. Minimal Conditions and Weak Emergence

3. Broad and the Epistemic Conception of Emergence

4. Strong Emergence in Terms of the Impossibility of Deduction

5. Emergence as Non-Aggregativity

6. Emergence in Terms of Non-Linear Interaction and Mill's Principle of the Composition of Causes

7. Qualitative and Quantitative Difference

8. The Limits of Explaining Emergent Properties

9. Avoiding Panpsychism

10. Response to a Version of Kripke's Argument against the Identity Theory

11. Emergence, Reduction, and Supervenience

12. Conclusion

5 | The Causal Efficacy of High-Level Properties.

1. Introduction

2. Causality, Causal Responsibility, and Causal Explanation

3. Mental Causation and Downward Causation

4. Mental Properties or Physical Properties Conceived with Mental Concepts?

Conclusion

References

Index

Back Cover.

Notes:

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Description based on print version record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

1-77385-607-3

1-77385-608-1

1-77385-609-X