Challenging knowledge / Jody Azzouni.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Azzouni, Jody, author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Skepticism.

Knowledge, Theory of.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (392 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2025]

Summary:

Starting-point epistemology (SPE) is a new position in epistemology that, coupled with agent-centred rationality - the idea that a rational agent is one who cleaves to their own picture of rationality - is the key to resolving philosophical scepticism. SPE acknowledges that metacogntively-sophisticated agents know that they know things, and know some things about the methods by which this happens. Agent-centred rationality implies that a metacognitively-sophisticated agent should only desert a knowledge claim because of a challenge they recognise to be fatal to that claim. Scepticism is metacognitive pathology. Except in those rare cases when an individual is cognitively damaged, sceptical arguments should fail. In this book, Jody Azzouni studies the various ways the cognitively healthy can protect themselves from prematurely denying what they take themselves to know.

Contents:

Cover

Half Title

Title Page

Copyright Page

Epigraph

Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction

I.1 Quine's Revolution?

I.2 Starting-Point Epistemology and Scepticism

I.3 How Little Starting-Point Epistemology Requires of Knowers

I.4 Fallibility and Infallibility

I.5 Old Language and New Language

I.6 Overview of the Contents of This Book

Part 1 Groundwork for SPE

1 "Knowing" and Knowing

1.1 Epistemology and How to Study It

1.2 The Minimal Concept of "Know(s)" And Its Advantages: 1

1.3 The Minimal Concept of "Know(s)" and Its Advantages: 2

1.4 The Minimal Concept of "Know(s)" and Its Advantages: 3

1.5 The Simple Lexical Vagueness of "Know(s)": 1

1.6 The Simple Lexical Vagueness of "Know(s)": 2

1.7 Concluding Remarks

2 G. E. Moore and the Relativized Burden of Proof

2.1 SPE and Agent-Centered Rationality

2.2 Moore's Responses to Sceptical Challenges

2.3 Moore's Proof of an External World

2.4 Concluding Remarks

3 Logical Possibility

3.1 Outline of the Chapter

3.2 Examples of How We Actually Challenge Possibilities

3.3 Epistemic Possibility Isn't Logical Possibility

3.4 The Epistemic Challenge of Establishing Consistency

3.5 Concluding Remarks

Part 2 Our Knowledge Practices

Introduction to Part 2

4 Our Knowledge-Gathering Methods as the Source of Errors

4.1 Introduction

4.2 The Individualized Nature of Our Methods of Knowing: A First Pass

4.3 Methods of Knowing and That the Kinds of Errors We Can Make Depend On the Epistemic Methods We Use

4.4 The Haloes of Possible Errors That Surround Our Methods

4.5 The Distinction Between the Possibilities an Agent Should Take for Real and the Ones They Shouldn't

4.6 Updating Metaknowledge About Methods

4.7 A One-Paragraph Transition to Chapter 5.

5 Justification and Our Knowledge-Gathering Methods

5.1 Introduction

5.2 ORDINARY BRIDGE: A Common Inference Pattern Between Knowing and Metaknowing

5.3 Metaknowledge: How We Talk About Justification

5.4 Being Justified Without Being Able to Give Justifications

5.5 Being Justified-About What One Remembers and About Global Claims-Without Being Able to Give Justifications for Them

5.6 The Ayer-Williams Construal of Sceptical Challenges

5.7 Concluding Remarks

Part 3 Scepticism

Introduction to Part 3

6 Dreams, Demons, and the Like

6.1 Introduction

6.2 A First Pass at an Analysis of Challenging Knowledge

6.3 Dream Sequences

6.3.1 Two Versions of the Dream Argument

6.3.2 A Peculiar Epistemic Asymmetry Between the Awakened State and the Dreaming State

6.3.3 The Intoxication Argument

6.3.4 A Symmetry Requirement On Confusing Psychological States

6.3.5 Concluding Remarks

6.4 The Really-Bad-Mental-State Argument

6.5 When Arguments Based On Possible Sceptical Scenarios Lead to Contradictions

6.6 What's Left to Do?

7 Real Possibilities of Really Bad Mental States

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Real Challenges to Knowledge Claims That Are Based On Lucid Dreaming

7.3 Real Challenges to Knowledge Claims Based On Waking Hallucinations

7.4 Concluding Remarks

8 Epistemic-Peer Disagreement and Pyrrhonic Scepticism

8.1 Introduction

8.2 Global Pyrrhonic Scepticism

8.3 Epistemic Peer Disagreement

8.3.1 Introductory Remarks

8.3.2 Epistemic Peers: Are There Any Real-World Examples of Them?

8.3.3 Genuine Epistemic-Peer Disagreements: Always a Matter of Mere Calculation

8.3.4 Epistemic-Peer Disagreements: Degrees of Confidence Are Matters of Calculation Too

8.3.5 Mischaracterizing Philosophical Debates

8.4 Local Pyrrhonic Scepticism

8.4.1 Introductory Remarks.

8.4.2 The Non-Pyrrhonic Defender of Local Pyrrhonism

8.4.3 Bueno's Defense of Laconic Pyrrhonics

8.4.4 It's All Over Now

Conclusion

Appendix Knowing-How and Knowing-That

I

II

Bibliography

Index.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on January 31, 2025).

ISBN:

9780197789636

0197789633

9780197789650

019778965X

9780197789643

0197789641

OCLC:

1513421470