Ethical naturalism and the problem of normativity / David Copp.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Copp, David, author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Naturalism.

Normativity (Ethics).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (377 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2024]

Summary:

Ethical realists hold that there are ethical facts that are the truth-makers of ethical beliefs - facts facts that are similar in all metaphysically & epistemologically important respects to biological, psychological, & physical ones. Ethical realism faces a variety of objections, but the most important is its purported inability to account for the normativity of the ethical facts that it postulates. Some philosophers think that the normativity objection poses an especially acute challenge to ethical naturalism because of its view that the ethical properties & facts are natural ones. David Copp aims to explain the naturalist's position, why it is important, & why we might find it plausible despite the objections it faces. He argues that, in fact, ethical naturalism is better positioned to answer the normativity objection, & to explain the nature of normativity, than its alternatives.

Contents:

Cover

Ethical Naturalism and the Problem of Normativity

Copyright

Contents

Acknowledgments

1. Introduction: The Problem of Normativity

2. What Is Normativity?

3. A Categorization of Theories of Normativity

3.1 Normative Formalism

3.2 Normative Conceptualism

3.3 Normative Objectualism

3.4 Desiderata for a Theory

4. Ethical Realism

4.1 The Parity Thesis

4.2 Beyond the Parity Thesis: Minimalism

4.3 Beyond the Parity Thesis: Five Doctrines

5. Some Alternatives to Ethical Naturalism

5.1 Standard Nonnaturalism

5.2 Meinongian Theories

5.3 Non-​Ontological Success Theories

5.4 Error Theory

5.5 Fictionalism

5.6 Expressivism

5.7 Constructivism

5.8 Constitutivism

6. Naturalism I: Natural Properties

6.1 Characterizations of the Natural

6.2 The Empirical Criterion of the Natural-​The Preferred Formulation

6.3 Objections to the Empirical Criterion

6.4 Why Naturalism?

7. Naturalism II: Structural Varieties

7.1 Reductive Ethical Naturalism and Metaphysical Analysis

7.2 Analytic versus Non-​Analytic Reductive Naturalism

7.3 Non-​Reductive Ethical Naturalism

7.4 Metaphysical and Normative Grounding?

8. Naturalism III: Substantive Varieties

8.1 Cornell Realism-​Grounded Non-​Reductive Naturalism

8.2 The Canberra Plan

8.3 Subjectivist Neo-​Humean Naturalism

8.4 Neo-​Aristotelian Naturalism

8.5 Pluralist-​Teleology

9. Objections and Replies

9.1 The "Is/​Ought Gap" or "Fact/​Value Gap"

9.2 The "Open Question Argument"

9.3 The "Argument from Queerness"

9.4 Ethical Motivation and the Expressivist Intuition

9.5 The Non-​Empirical Character of Ethical Belief

9.6 Parfit's Objections

9.7 Ardent Realism and Reference-​Determination

9.8 The Normative Question and Transparency

9.9 The Just Too Different Objection.

10. The Problem of Normativity

References

Index.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on November 6, 2024).

ISBN:

9780197601617

0197601618

9780197601594

0197601596

9780197601600

019760160X

OCLC:

1477323567