Comprehensive deterrence theory : the science and policy of punishment / Daniel P. Mears, Mark C. Stafford.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Mears, Daniel P., 1966- author.

Stafford, Mark C., author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Deterrence (Strategy).

Punishment.

Criminal justice, Administration of.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xix, 265 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2025.

Summary:

First articulated more than 250 years ago, deterrence remains a central theory in criminology and continues to be the bedrock of the vast bulk of criminal justice policy. But few updates to the original theory of deterrence have been made, and crime-based punishment has only grown tougher, resulting in a historically unprecedented growth in imprisonment and an even greater reliance on deterrence to justify all kinds of punishment. These changes have occurred despite consistent or strong evidence to show that such punishments actually deter crime. In this book, renowned criminologists Daniel P. Mears and Mark C. Stafford provide an in-depth understanding of the classical account of deterrence theory, its limitations, and a reconceptualized version that establishes a more complete and powerful picture of how legal punishments can deter crime. Thorough and corrective, Comprehensive Deterrence Theory gives readers a new way of thinking about and understanding legal punishment.

Contents:

Cover

Half-title

Title page

Imprints page

Epigraph

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Preface

Acknowledgments

1 Introduction

1.1 Motivation for this Book

1.2 Focus of This Book

1.3 Goals of This Book

2 The Need for Reconceptualizing Deterrence Theory

2.1 Origins of Deterrence Theory

2.2 A Problematically Narrow Conceptualization

2.3 Deterrence Theory as a Dominant Account of Crime in Criminology

2.4 Deterrence Theory as a Dominant Influence on Policy, Historically and to the Present

2.5 One Solution: A Preliminary Presentation of CDT

2.6 Conclusion

3 Research on Deterrence

3.1 Key Findings from the Literature

3.2 Additional Findings from the Literature

3.3 Conclusion

4 Comprehensive Deterrence Theory: Intrinsic Elements

4.1 Element 1: Costs and Rewards of Crime and Non-Crime

4.2 Element 2: Three-Way Interaction of Punishment Certainty, Severity, and Celerity

4.3 Element 3: Functional Form of Effects of Punishment Certainty, Severity, and Celerity

4.4 Element 4: Objective Conditions vs. Perceptions

4.5 Element 5: Personal and Vicarious Costs of Crime and Non-Crime

4.6 Element 6: Personal and Vicarious Rewards of Crime and Non-Crime

4.7 Element 7: Duration of Punishment Costs and All Other Costs and Rewards

4.8 Element 8: Punishment Levels, Changes, and Level-Change Combinations

4.9 Conclusion

5 Comprehensive Deterrence Theory: Principles

5.1 CDT: An Overview

5.2 Principle 1: Costs and Rewards of Crime and Non-Crime

5.3 Principle 2: Three-Way Interaction of Punishment Certainty, Severity, and Celerity

5.4 Principle 3: Functional Form of Effects of Punishment Certainty, Severity, and Celerity

5.5 Principle 4: Objective and Perceptual Deterrence Processes.

5.6 Principle 5: Personal and Vicarious Costs of Crime and Non-Crime

5.7 Principle 6: Personal and Vicarious Rewards of Crime and Non-Crime

5.8 Principles 5-and-6: Personal and Vicarious Costs and Rewards of Crime and Non-Crime

5.9 Principle 7: Duration of Punishment Costs and All Other Costs and Rewards

5.10 Principle 8: Punishment Levels, Changes, and Level-Change Combinations

5.11 CDT: A Summary

5.12 CDT: Implications

5.13 Conclusion

6 Comprehensive Deterrence Theory: Next Steps for Advancing CDT

6.1 How a Focus on Testing Predictions May Advance CDT

6.2 How a Focus on Each Element and Principle May Advance CDT

6.3 How a Focus on ''Second-Level'' Principles May Advance CDT

6.4 How a Focus on New Corollaries May Advance CDT

6.5 How a Focus on Punishment Effects across Individuals, Groups, and Conditions May Advance CDT

6.6 How a Focus on Deterrence and Types of Crime May Advance CDT

6.7 How a Focus on Deterrence and Units of Analysis May Advance CDT

6.8 How a Focus on Crime Theories May Advance CDT

6.9 How a Focus on Offending Onset, Persistence, and Desistance May Advance CDT

6.10 Conclusion: Advancing CDT and Deterrence Scholarship More Generally

7 Comprehensive Deterrence Theory: Points of Clarification

7.1 CDT and the Nature of Punishment

7.2 CDT and Measurement of Costs and Rewards and All Aspects of Deterrence

7.3 CDT and the Question of Legal vs. Extralegal Punishment

7.4 CDT and Objective vs. Perceived Punishment

7.5 CDT and the Non-Distinction between Specific and General Deterrence

7.6 CDT and the Importance of Including Intrinsic Elements in Research

7.7 CDT and Evaluation of Positive vs. Negative Evidence for Deterrence

7.8 CDT and Other Theoretical Conceptualizations of Deterrence

7.9 CDT and Potential Problems and Benefits of a More Complex Theory.

7.10 CDT and the Importance of Intrinsic Elements for All Theory

7.11 Conclusion

8 Comprehensive Deterrence Theory: Policy Implications

8.1 Insufficient Knowledge Exists to Call Deterrence-Focused Punishment Policy Evidence-Based

8.2 Policies That Assume Punishment Will Deter May Be Misguided

8.3 Punishment May Be Criminogenic

8.4 Punishment May Not Have Obvious Effects

8.5 Deterrence Effectiveness Depends on Intrinsic Elements and Theoretical Principles

8.6 Deterrence Is Complicated, But That Does Not Require Giving Up on It

8.7 CDT and Implications for Deterring Different Types of Crime

8.8 CDT and Implications for Jails and Prison Systems

8.9 CDT and Implications for Parents, Schools, Organizations, and More

8.10 Conclusion

9 Conclusion

9.1 CDT in a Nutshell

9.2 Implications for Theory and Research

9.3 Implications for Policy

9.4 Conclusion

References

Index.

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 07 Mar 2025).

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

1-009-59273-4

1-009-59276-9

1-009-59272-6

OCLC:

1504502264