Oxford studies in normative ethics. Volume 14 / edited by Mark Timmons.

Format:

Book

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Normativity (Ethics).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (286 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2024]

Summary:

'Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics' is an annual forum for new work in normative ethical theory. Leading philosophers advance our understanding of a wide range of moral issues and positions, from analysis of competing normative theories to questions of how we should act and live well. It is an essential resource for scholars and students working in moral philosophy.

Contents:

Cover

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics

Copyright

Contents

Acknowledgments

List of Contributors

Introduction

1: How Do Personal Relationships Make a Moral Difference?

2: Prudence, Beneficence, and Time

1. Time-NeutralPrudence

2. Time-RelativePrudence

3. The Connection between Prudence and Beneficence

4. World-RelativePrudence

5. Conclusion

Appendix: Clarifying the Link

References

3: Temperance, Continence, Weakness, Indulgence, Compulsion

1. Introduction and Intemperance

2. A Gloss on Temperance

3. Weakness of Will

4. Continence

5. A Model of Temperance

4: The All or Nothing Ranking Reversal and the Unity of Morality

1. Morally Better

1.1. Supererogation is Better

1.2. Morally Better as Morally More Choiceworthy

1.3. Right &gt

Wrong

2. Moral Commending Weight

2.1. The Basic Concept

2.2. Commending vs. Justifying and Requiring Weight

3. The All or Nothing Problem for Pairwise Precedence

3.1. The All or Nothing Verdicts

3.2. Pairwise Precedence

4. All or Nothing Ranking Reversal Explained

4.1. Deontic Precedence

4.2. Two-OptionVerdict Explained

4.3. Three-OptionVerdict Explained

5. The Unity of Morality

6. Conflicting Intuitions?

7. The Unity Explained

5: Hypocrisy as Two-Faced

1. Introduction

2. Attitudinal Hypocrisy

3. Attitudinal Hypocrisy Is Blameworthy

4. Behavioral Hypocrisy

5. The Janus-FacedStructure of the Vice of Hypocrisy

6. Existing Accounts

7. Conclusion

6: Hybrid Goods

1. The Character of Hybrid Goods

2. Grass Counting in Context

3. Friendship

4. Engagement with Incommensurable Goods

7: Explanatory Pluralism in Normative Ethics

2. 'Normative', 'Explanation', and 'Pluralism'

3. Two Normative Explanatory Monisms.

4. Why Pluralism?

5. Too Many Types of Explanation?

6. One Type to Rule Them All?

7. Not a Genuine Pluralism?

8: Value in the Mere Shape of Episodes

Forks on the Left, Knives on the Right

First Course: Location

Second Course: Substance

Third Course: Scope

Dessert

9: Worlds Collided: Love as Seeing and Seeing-With

2. Love as Seeing

3. Love as Seeing-With

4. The Beloved as Another Subjectivity

5. Love's Difficulties

10: Expressive Duties Are Demandable and Enforceable

2. Demanding and Enforcing

3. Demanding and Enforcing Expressive Duties

3.1. The Control Argument

3.2. The Value Argument

3.3. The Grounds Argument

3.4. The Latitude Argument

4. Objections

4.1. Not Demands

4.2. Not Enforcement

11: Forgiveness and Moral Luck

2. Varieties of Electivity

3. Differential Forgiveness

4. Forgiveness Luck

4.1. Moral Luck

4.2. Moral Status

4.3. From Differential Forgiveness to Forgiveness Luck

5. Objections

6. Conclusion

12: Why Consequentialize?: Some Reasons and Some Obstacles

2. Equivalence of Theories: Consequentialization and Geometrization

3. The Teleology of Action and the Compelling Idea

4. Foot's Thesis and the Varieties of Consequentialist Structure

Index.

Notes:

Includes index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on August 29, 2024).

ISBN:

9780198930815

019893081X

9780198930792

0198930798

OCLC:

1453504384