Perceptual knowledge and self-awareness / edited by Andrea Giananti, Johannes Roessler, Gianfranco Soldati.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Giananti, Andrea, editor.

Roessler, Johannes, editor.

Soldati, Gianfranco, editor.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Perception (Philosophy).

Self-knowledge, Theory of.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (260 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2024]

Summary:

There is a tendency, in contemporary epistemology, to treat 'perceptual knowledge' and 'self-knowledge' as labels for different and largely unconnected sets of philosophical problems. The project of this volume is to bring out how much is to be gained from treating the two topics as, on the contrary, intimately connected. One set of questions that comes into view when we do concerns the sense in which perceptual knowledge, as understood from the first-person perspective, seem to be 'direct'. In a famous passage, Austin contrasted reliance on what we call 'evidence' with the way perceptual experience 'settles' questions. How should we understand the difference? In what sense is perceptual knowledge 'direct', in contradistinction to evidence-based, inferential knowledge? A connected set of issues has to do with the relationship between the epistemic authority of perception and self-consciousness.

Contents:

Cover

Half Title

Title Page

Copyright Page

Contents

Preface

List of Contributors

1 Introduction: Perceptual Knowledge and Self-Awareness

1.1 The authority of perception

1.2 Perceptual authority and self-awareness

1.3 First-person self-knowledge

References

2 The Possibility of Perceptual Knowledge

Reference

3 The Scope of Perception

4 Seeing and Thereby Knowing

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Objectual perception and perceptual knowledge

4.3 Two conceptions of propositional seeing

4.4 Stroud on seeing what is so

4.5 In what way is objectual seeing fundamental?

4.6 Seeing as a way of knowing

4.7 Conclusion

5 Recognitional Abilities and Knowing What One Sees

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Perceptual recognition and appearances

5.3 Perceptual-recognitional abilities

5.4 A contrasting picture

5.5 Access to facts as to what we perceive to be so

5.6 The justification for belief that perception provides

5.7 Matters arising

6 Appearances, Perceptual Knowledge, and Self-Knowledge

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Appearances, qualitative concepts, and normal circumstances

6.3 Acquaintance and judgement

6.4 The epistemic standing of perception

6.5 Reason and immediate justification

6.6 Self-knowledge and transparency

6.7 Phenomenal 'Retreat'

6.8 Knowing that I perceive

7 Perceptual Beliefs and Beliefs About Perception

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Theories of belief: some sceptical reflections

7.2.1 Belief ascription

7.2.2 Belief acquisition

7.2.3 Belief and concepts

7.2.4 Belief and content

7.3 Understanding perception

7.4 Conclusion

8 Perception, Perceptual Knowledge, and Perceptual Self-Knowledge

8.1 Introduction.

8.2 The Two-Tier framework for understanding propositional knowledge

8.3 Perceptual knowledge and the Two-Tier framework

8.4 Perceptual self-knowledge: expression, rational response, and joint attention

8.5 Conclusion and loose ends

9 Perception, Knowledge, and Reflection

9.1 Introduction

9.2 Perceptual recognition: first- and second-order?

9.3 Perceptual judgement and reflection

9.4 Perceivers' self-knowledge as non-observational knowledge

9.5 Conclusion

10 Perception as a Rational Capacity

10.1 Rational capacities

10.2 Perception as a rational capacity

10.3 Perceptual capacities and explanation

10.4 Perceptual capacities and self-consciousness

10.5 Conclusion

11 Unsettling Questions

11.1 Settling questions

11.2 How do you know?

11.3 Why do you think so?

11.4 Are you sure?

11.5 Conclusion

12 Knowledge in Action and Knowledge of Perception

12.1 Motivation

12.2 Two-factor theories of knowledge in action

12.3 Are intentions inner states?

12.4 Where does Donnellan leave us?

12.5 A new model for knowledge in action: perception

12.6 Non-object-directed awareness in action

12.7 The object of knowledge in action

12.8 Conclusion

13 Spontaneity Without Rationality: A Kantian Approach to Self-Consciousness and Perceptual Content

13.1 Introduction

13.2 Kant on spontaneity and self-consciousness

13.3 The rational agency interpretation of Kantian self-consciousness

13.4 Perceptual spontaneity and normative sorting

13.5 Normative sorting without reasons

Index.

Notes:

Includes index.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on September 26, 2024).

ISBN:

0-19-196521-9

0-19-269572-X

OCLC:

1457311662