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Insider Guarantees in Corporate Finance / Aart Jonkers.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Jonkers, A. L., 1987- author.
- Series:
- European and International Insolvency Law Studies
- European and International Insolvency Law Studies ; v.5
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Corporations--Finance.
- Corporations.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (390 pages)
- Edition:
- First edition.
- Place of Publication:
- Den Haag, Netherlands : Eleven International Publishing, [2020]
- Summary:
- Insider guarantees play a crucial role in corporate finance.In small and medium companies shareholders frequently guarantee business debts towards a professional creditor, often the bank.In corporate groups, group companies often guarantee each other's debts towards a lender.The economic dynamics involved are however poorly understood.
- Contents:
- Intro
- Table of Contents
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Comparative law &
- economics
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Comparative law &
- 2.1 Functionalist comparison and its limits
- 2.2 The economic perspective on law
- 2.3 Using law and economics to define a problem and to measure the effects of rules
- 2.4 Using law and economics to evaluate results of the comparison
- 2.5 Influence of comparative law on law and economics
- 2.6 Limits of the approach
- 2.7 Summary
- 3 Economics: Micro-Economics With Focus on Opportunism
- 3.1 Transaction Cost Economics and bounded rationality
- 3.2 Trust and opportunism
- 3.3 The difficulty of policing opportunism with contract law rules
- 3.4 Transaction Cost Economics and the guarantee relationship
- 3.5 Summary
- 4 Conclusion
- Chapter 2 The beneficial economic function of the guarantee relationship in corporate finance
- 2 Signaling
- 2.1 Adverse selection
- 2.2 Credit rationing
- 2.3 Types of guarantees suitable for signaling
- 2.4 Summary
- 3 Reducing debtor misbehavior
- 3.1 Guarantees limiting opportunistic default in general
- 3.2 Opportunistic use of limited liability and the role of guarantees
- 3.2.1 Overinvestment
- 3.2.2 Inadequate effort supply
- 3.2.3 Asset shifting/asset stripping
- 3.3 The function of other devices
- 3.4 Summary
- 4 Specialization in monitoring
- 5 Specialization in risk-bearing
- 6 Conclusion
- Chapter 3 Opportunistic use of the guarantee relationship in corporate finance
- 2 Opportunism towards parties inside the guarantee relationship
- 2.1 Opportunism towards a weak guarantor
- 2.2 Opportunism towards the debtor
- 2.3 Summary
- 3 Opportunism towards outsiders to the guarantee relationship
- 3.1 Ex ante opportunism: Opaque priority structures
- 3.1.1 Opaque seniority through guarantees.
- 3.1.2 Justification for selective perforation of limited liability?
- 3.1.3 Justification for priority analogous to real security rights?
- 3.1.4 Justification for strong-form double proof and deficiency double proof?
- 3.1.5 The shareholder guarantee as an indirect shareholder loan
- 3.1.6 Summary
- 3.2 Ex post opportunism: covert insider dealing
- 3.2.1 Preferences in the twilight zone
- 3.2.2 Subtler forms of opportunism: feeding the lien, inefficient investment attitudes, inefficient bankruptcy filing
- 3.2.3 The inefficiency of creditor control through guarantees
- 3.2.4 Control through guarantees is more problematic than through real security rights
- 3.2.5 Specific dynamics in a reorganization procedure
- 3.2.6 Summary
- Chapter 4 Dutch law on opportunism with the guarantee relationship
- 2 Introduction to types of guarantees in Dutch law
- 2.1 Suretyship ('borgtocht')
- 2.1.1 The relationship between creditor-guarantor
- 2.1.2 The relationship between guarantor-principal debtor
- 2.1.3 Co-suretyship, contribution
- 2.2 Co-debtorship for security purposes ('contractuele hoofdelijkheid')
- 2.3 Independent guarantee ('onafhankelijke garantie')
- 2.4 Group guarantees for accounting purposes ('403-verklaring')
- 3 Dutch law on opportunism towards parties inside the guarantee relationship
- 3.1 Definition of consumer suretyship
- 3.2 Consumer protection: duty to warn the surety
- 3.3 Protection of consumer suretyship through mandatory suretyship law
- 3.4 Protection of consumer guarantors other than sureties
- 3.5 Protection of weak parties other than consumers
- 3.6 Protection of legal persons standing surety
- 3.7 The spouse
- 3.8 Protection through bankruptcy law
- 3.9 Summary
- 4 Dutch law on opportunism towards parties outside the guarantee relationship.
- 4.1 Regulatory approach to opaque priority structures (ex ante opportunism)
- 4.1.1 Annulling limited liability
- 4.1.2 Avoidance of the guarantee itself
- 4.1.3 Subordinating loans guaranteed by shareholders
- 4.1.4 Disallowing double proof
- 4.2 Regulatory approaches to covert insider dealing (ex post opportunism)
- 4.2.1 Avoidance of payments on guaranteed loans
- 4.2.2 Possibilities for redress outside preference law
- 4.2.3 Shareholder liability for unlawful withdrawals outside preference law
- 4.2.4 Director liability for insider preferences
- 4.2.5 Lender tort liability for insider preferences
- 4.2.6 Specific dynamics in reorganization
- 4.2.7 Summary of Dutch law on external relations
- 5 Conclusion
- Chapter 5 US law on opportunism with the guarantee relationship
- 2 Introduction to types of guarantees in US law
- 2.1 Guarantees under the Restatement of Suretyship
- 2.1.1 The relationship between creditor and surety
- 2.1.2 The relationship between surety-principal debtor
- 2.1.3 Co-suretyship and sub-suretyship, contribution
- 2.2 Joint and several contractual liability
- 2.3 Independent guarantee
- 3 US law on opportunism towards parties inside the guarantee relationship
- 3.1 Specific consumer guarantor protection
- 3.2 Protection of guarantors that are legal persons
- 3.3 Protection based on general contract law between creditor and guarantor
- 3.3.1 Consideration
- 3.3.2 Statute of Frauds
- 3.3.3 Construction
- 3.4 Protection through bankruptcy law
- 3.5 Summary of US law on the internal relations
- 4 US law on opportunism towards parties outside the guarantee relationship
- 4.1 Regulatory approach to opaque priority structures (ex ante opportunism)
- 4.1.3 Subordination of claims guaranteed by shareholders.
- 4.1.4 Disallowing double proof
- 4.2.2 Director liability for insider preferences
- 4.2.3 Lender liability
- 4.2.4 Bad boy guarantees
- 4.2.5 Fresh start laws
- 4.3 Summary of US law on external relations
- Chapter 6 German law on opportunism with the guarantee relationship
- 2 Introduction to types of guarantees in German law
- 2.1 The archetype of personal security: suretyship ('Bürgschaft')
- 2.2 Co-debtorship ('Schuldbeitritt') and Patronatserklärung
- 2.4 Group guarantees for accounting purposes
- 3 German law on opportunism towards parties inside the guarantee relationship
- 3.1 Protection against immoral suretyship
- 3.1.1 Development of case law on immoral suretyship
- 3.1.2 Current state of the case law on the protection of weak sureties
- 3.1.3 Summary
- 3.2 Protection through the written form requirement
- 3.3 Consumer credit law
- 3.4 Doorstep sales law
- 3.5 Protection through unfair standard terms control
- 3.6 Protection of the spouse
- 3.7 Protection through bankruptcy law
- 3.8 Summary of German law on opportunism with the internal relationship
- 4 German law on opportunism towards parties outside the guarantee relationship
- 4.1 Regulatory approaches to opaque priority structures (ex ante opportunism)
- 4.1.2 Not upholding the guarantee itself
- 4.1.3 Subordinating claims guaranteed by shareholders
- 4.1.4 Disallowing double proof.
- 4.1.5 Summary of German law on opaque priority structures with guarantees
- 4.2.2 Shareholder liability for unlawful withdrawals outside preference law
- 4.2.3 Director liability for insider preferences
- 4.2.4 Lender liability as de facto director
- 4.2.5 Specific dynamics in reorganization
- 4.2.6 Summary of German law on covert insider dealing
- Chapter 7 Comparison &
- synthesis
- 2 The beneficial function of guarantees in corporate finance
- 3 Opportunism towards parties inside the guarantee relationship
- 3.1 The problems with opportunism towards parties inside the guarantee relationship
- 3.2 The approaches of US, German and Dutch law to opportunism inside the guarantee relationship
- 3.3 Conclusions on the optimal approach to opportunism inside the guarantee relationship
- 4 Opportunism towards parties outside the guarantee relationship: (1) opaque priority structures
- 4.1 The problems with opaque priority structures
- 4.2 The approaches of US, German and Dutch law to opaque priority structures
- 4.2.1 Annulling limited liability ('tearing down the walls')
- 4.2.2 Avoiding the piercing guarantees ('enforcing the walls')
- 4.2.3 Limiting double proof
- 4.2.4 Indirectly and partially subordinating shareholderguaranteed claims
- 4.3 Conclusions on the optimal regulatory approach to opaque priority structures
- 5 Opportunism towards parties outside the guarantee relationship: (2) covert insider dealing
- 5.1 The problems with covert insider dealing
- 5.2 Approaches of US, German and Dutch law to covert insider dealing through guarantees
- 5.2.1 Transaction avoidance
- 5.2.2 Director liability
- 5.2.3 Shareholder liability.
- 5.2.4 Recourse to the guaranteed lender.
- Notes:
- Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
- Description based on print version record.
- Other Format:
- Print version: Jonkers, Aart Insider Guarantees in Corporate Finance
- ISBN:
- 94-6094-852-9
- OCLC:
- 1378391706
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