First-Person Thought Action, Identification and Experience Maik Niemeck

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Niemeck, Maik, Author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Selbstbewusstsein.

Bewusstsein.

Immunität gegenüber Fehlern durch Fehlidentifikation.

De Se Skeptizismus.

Indexikalische Gedanken.

Selbstsorge.

Nicht-begriffliches Selbstbewusstsein.

Prä-reflexivs Selbstbewusstsein.

Emotionen.

Selbst-Repräsentationalismus.

Self-Consciousness.

Consciousness.

Immunity to Error through Misidentification.

De Se Skepticism.

Indexical Thought.

Self-Concern.

Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness.

Pre-reflective Self-Consciousness.

Emotions.

Self-Representationalism.

Local Subjects:

Selbstbewusstsein.

Bewusstsein.

Immunität gegenüber Fehlern durch Fehlidentifikation.

De Se Skeptizismus.

Indexikalische Gedanken.

Selbstsorge.

Nicht-begriffliches Selbstbewusstsein.

Prä-reflexivs Selbstbewusstsein.

Emotionen.

Selbst-Repräsentationalismus.

Self-Consciousness.

Consciousness.

Immunity to Error through Misidentification.

De Se Skepticism.

Indexical Thought.

Self-Concern.

Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness.

Pre-reflective Self-Consciousness.

Emotions.

Self-Representationalism.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (242 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Paderborn Brill | mentis 2022

Biography/History:

Maik Niemeck lehrt und forscht zur Philosophie des Geistes (mit dem Schwerpunkt Theorien des Bewusstseins und Selbstbewusstseins) an der Philipps-Universität Marburg, an welcher er auch promoviert wurde. Zuvor war er Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am University College Freiburg und hat an den Universitäten Göttingen und Halle studiert. Forschungsaufenthalte haben ihn an das King's College London und die University of Notre Dame geführt.

Summary:

The book offers new answers to two central questions that have been heavily debated, especially in recent years, in the debate on so-called de se skepticism: Is there something special about first-person thinking? And how does it relate to other forms of self-consciousness? The answer to the first question is a resounding "yes." This assertion is justified by the double-reflexive structure, motivational force, and specific concern that first-personal thinking involves. Regarding the second question, the book concludes that there are non-linguistic forms of self-consciousness. However, these should not be understood as representational contents or non-relational properties, but as mental relations that, without themselves being represented, can contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious states. In this respect, the book also provides a justification for the rarely considered impure intentionalism.

Contents:

Intro

Content

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Chapter 1. What is Special about First-Person Thought?

1.1 Introduction

1.2 The Essentiality of First-Person Thought - Messy Shoppers, Weird Attitudes and Attempts to Deal with Them

1.3 De Se Skepticism and the Action Inventory Model (AIM)

1.4 Restricting the Essentiality Thesis

1.5 Arguing Against the Action Inventory Model

1.6 Peculiarities of First-Person Thought and their Role for Action

1.6.1 The Necessary Double Reflexivity of First-Person Thought

1.6.2 The Effortlessness and Security of First-Person Thought

1.6.3 Excursus: Relational Awareness and Indexical Thought

1.6.4 Excursus: Relational Awareness and the Use of the First Person in Speech

1.7 The Motivational Force of First-Person Thought - A Research Desideratum?

Chapter 2. Is the First Person Thick?

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Setting the Stage: Specifying the Thesis and Exposing its Historical Roots

2.3 What is Special about First-Person Concern?

2.4 Specifying the Nature of the Evaluative Component

2.5 Introspective Consciousness and Concern

2.6 Is Concern for One's Own Mental States Concern for Oneself?

2.7 Some Empirical Support

2.8 Concluding Remarks

Chapter 3. Demystifying Immunity to Error through Misidentification

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Getting IEM right

3.2.1 Reference Failure and Errors through Misidentification

3.2.2 The Reasoning behind Errors through Misidentification

3.3 IEM as a Property of Thought Types?

3.4 IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens?

3.5 The Ubiquity of IEM as a Property of Thought Tokens

3.6 What about the Infallibility Intuition?

3.7 IEM and Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence

3.7.1 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence and Property Possession

3.7.2 Subject-Centered Sources of Evidence, Immediacy and Identification.

3.7.3 Metaphysical IEM - Reviving Partial Infallibility

3.7.4 Resumé - What Can Be Gained from Metaphysical IEM?

3.7.5 Metaphysical IEM and its Relation to Self-Awareness and First-Person Thought

3.8 Concluding Remarks

Chapter 4. Self-Identification and the Regress

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Shoemaker on Self-Identification

4.3 Which Conclusion to Draw?

4.4 Two Potential Issues with Shoemaker's Regress Argument

4.4.1 The Scope Problem

4.4.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem - Identification without Descriptive Beliefs?

4.5 How to Deal with these Worries?

4.5.1 The Scope Problem

4.5.2 The Implausible Constraint Problem

4.5.3 Some Consequences for the Relation between Self-Awareness and Perception

Chapter 5. The Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness

5.1 Introduction

5.2 The Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I'

5.3 Possible Objections to the Argument Based on the Meaning of 'I'

5.4 The Cognitive Role of Consciousness and Replies to the Objections

5.4.1 Preliminaries: The Mind-Body Relation

5.4.2 The Functional Correlates of Consciousness

5.4.3 Reply to the Objections

5.5 Concluding Remarks

Chapter 6. How to Account for the Subjective Character of Experience?

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Self-Representationalism

6.2.1 From Higher-Order to Same-Order Representationalism

6.2.2 Self-Representationalism and the Subjective Character

6.3 Is the Subjective Character a Representational Content?

6.3.1 Do we Perceive Ourselves?

6.3.2 Can all Conscious Creatures Believe that they are?

6.3.3 Is the Subjective Character Something in Between?

6.4 Potential Issues of Self-Representationalism

6.5 The Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness

6.6 Potential Issues of the Concept of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness

6.7 The Self-Mode of Experience.

6.7.1 The Subjective Character as a Way of Experiencing

6.7.2 What are Intentional Modes?

6.7.3 Justification - Is There a Place for Intentional Modes?

6.7.4 The Subjective Character as an Intentional Mode

6.8 The Evaluative Function of Modes - Subject Concerning Relations

6.9 Virtues of the Self-Mode Account

6.10 Concluding Remarks: Some Unresolved Questions and Objections

Chapter 7. Conclusions

Literature

Index.

Notes:

Includes index.

ISBN:

3-96975-264-7

Publisher Number:

9783969752647