The edge of sentience : risk and precaution in humans, other animals, and AI / Jonathan Birch.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Birch, Jonathan (Professor of Philosophy), author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Senses and sensation.

Perception (Philosophy).

Consciousness.

Cognition.

Cognition in animals.

Artificial intelligence.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (398 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2024]

Summary:

Can octopuses feel pain or pleasure? Can we tell if a person unresponsive after severe injury might be suffering? When does a fetus begin having conscious experiences? These questions about the edge of sentience are subject to enormous uncertainty. This book builds a framework to help us reach ethically sound decisions on how to manage the risks.

Contents:

Cover

The Edge of Sentience : Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI

Copyright

Dedication

Epigraph

Contents

List of Illustrations

Summary of the Framework and Proposals

Precautionary Framework

Proposals about Specific Cases

People with Disorders of Consciousness

Human Fetuses and Embryos

Human Neural Organoids

Other Animals

Artificial Intelligence (AI)

1: A Walk along the Edge

1.1 The Unmarked Border

1.2 Decision Points

1.3 When to Stop?

1.4 Accidental Golems

1.5 The Goal: A Precautionary Framework

1.6 A Note on Influences

1.7 Summary of Chapter 1

2: The Concept of Sentience

2.1 Sentience and Consciousness

2.2 'Phenomenal Consciousness' as Unstable Common Ground

2.3 Affective Space

2.4 Affective Spaces beyond the Human Case

2.5 Three Views on the Nature of Valence

2.6 The Ethical Significance of Valence

2.7 Summary of Chapter 2

Part I: The Zone of Reasonable Disagreement

3: The Mind-Body Problem

3.1 Disagreeing Reasonably about Sentience

Baseless Recommendations

Dogmatism

Moral Views beyond the Pale

3.2 Might Conscious Experience Leave No Trace on Behaviour?

3.3 Is Conscious Experience One Kind or Many?

3.4 Radical Alternatives

Interactionist Dualism

Russellian Monism

Biopsychism

The Integrated Information Theory

3.5 Are Agency and Embodiment Necessary?

3.6 The Relevant Scale of Functional Organization

3.7 Are There Borderline (Indeterminate) Cases of Sentience?

3.8 Summary of Chapter 3

4: Ethics and Religion

4.1 Bio- and Ecocentrism

4.2 Agency-centric Views

4.3 Consciousness without Valence

4.4 Rationality-centric Views

4.5 Abrahamic Religions and the Stewardship Tradition

4.6 Indian Religions and Ahimsa

4.7 Summary of Chapter 4.

5: The Science of Consciousness and Emotion

5.1 Grades of Optimism

5.2 The Conscious and the Unconscious: The Case of Blindsight

5.3 The Conscious and the Unconscious: Wider Lessons

5.4 Conscious and Unconscious Affect?

5.5 How Important Is the Neocortex? Two Contrasting Pictures

5.6 Looking beyond the Mammalian Case

5.7 Summary of Chapter 5

Part II: A Precautionary Framework

6: Converging on Precautions

6.1 Uncertainty, Inconclusiveness, and Dissensus

6.2 A Scientific Meta-consensus on the Range of Realistic Possibilities

6.3 Two Bridging Concepts: Sentience Candidates and Investigation Priorities

6.4 In Search of Ethical Framework Principles

6.5 Back to the Edge

6.6 Relation to Other Precautionary Ideas

6.7 Summary of Chapter 6

7: Involving the Public

7.1 Citizens' Assemblies and Panels: The Basic Idea

7.2 Avoiding the Tyranny of Expert Values

7.3 Three Alternatives

Elected Representatives

Referendums

A Common Currency

7.4 Objections to Citizens' Panels: Representativeness, Deference, Competence

Representativeness

Deference

Competence

7.5 Summary of Chapter 7

8: Debating Proportionality

8.1 Curating Options: Learning from the Climate Assembly UK

8.2 A Pragmatic Analysis of Proportionality

Test 1: Permissibility-in-Principle

Test 2: Adequacy

Test 3: Reasonable Necessity

Test 4: Consistency

8.3 The Division of Labour Implicit in the PARC Tests

8.4 Public Policy and Private Policies

8.5 Philosopher as Sage, Philosopher as Proposer

8.6 Summary of Chapter 8

Part III: Sentience and The Human Brain

9: People with Disorders of Consciousness

9.1 The Problem of Diagnostic Uncertainty

9.2 The Search for Cognitive-Motor Dissociation

9.3 The Realistic Possibility of Continuing Valenced Experience in the PVS.

9.4 Pain Management and the 'Assume Sentient' Principle

9.5 Moving Past the PVS/MCS Distinction

9.6 The Question of Treatment Withdrawal

9.7 Summary of Chapter 9

10: Fetuses and Embryos

10.1 The Cautionary Tale of Newborn Pain

10.2 Fetal Sentience and Women's Rights: Separating the Issues

10.3 Fetuses as Sentience Candidates

10.4 Taking a Precautionary Stance towards Fetuses

10.5 Communicating Uncertainty in the Abortion Clinic

10.6 Human Embryos and the 14-Day Rule

10.7 The 14-Day Rule and Sentience

10.8 Summary of Chapter 10

11: Neural Organoids

11.1 The Promise of Organoid Research

11.2 No Risk of Sentience?

11.3 Early Warning Signs

11.4 Assessing Sentience Candidature in Neural Organoids

11.5 Analogies with Embryos

11.6 The Brainstem Rule

11.7 Possible Regulatory Frameworks

11.8 Summary of Chapter 11

Part IV: Sentience in Other Animals

12: The Clearest Candidates

12.1 Fishes and Invertebrates as the New Centre of the Debate

12.2 Octopuses as 'Honorary Vertebrates'

12.3 The Story of the 'Sentience Act'

12.4 The Institute of Medical Ethics (IME) Criteria

12.5 Problems with the IME Criteria

12.6 My Team's Revised Criteria

12.7 The Question of Generalization

12.8 What We Found, in Brief

Example 1: Conditioned Place Avoidance in Octopuses

Example 2: 'Anxiety-Like States' in Crayfish

Example 3: Integrative Brain Regions Linked to Learning and Memory

12.9 From Grades of Evidence to Sharp Decisions

12.10 Some Critical Reflections

12.11 Summary of Chapter 12

13: Pushing the Boundaries

13.1 Insects: The Old Received Wisdom

13.2 Insects: The Emerging New Picture

Judgement Bias

Evaluative Modelling in the Central Complex

Working Memory, Attention and Sophisticated Associative Learning

13.3 Insects as Sentience Candidates.

13.4 Four Investigation Priorities

Gastropod Molluscs

Nematode Worms

Spiders

Insect Larvae

13.5 Neither Sentience Candidates nor Investigation Priorities: Plants and Unicellular Organisms

13.6 Summary of Chapter 13

14: Frontiers of Proportionality

14.1 Taking Invertebrates Seriously

14.2 Codes of Good Practice and Licensing Schemes

14.3 Against Octopus Farming

14.4 Towards Humane Slaughter

14.5 Summary of Chapter 14

Part V: Preparing for Artificial Sentience

15: Against Complacency

15.1 A Case against Complacency

15.2 Sources of Risk 1: Whole-Brain Emulation

15.3 Sources of Risk 2: Artificial Evolution

15.4 Sources of Risk 3: Minimal Implementations of Cognitive Theories of Consciousness

15.5 Summary of Chapter 15

16: Large Language Models and the Gaming Problem

16.1 The Gaming Problem: When the System Knows the Criteria

16.2 Boxing the AI: Schneider and Turner's 'Artificial Consciousness Test'

16.3 The Need for Deep Computational Markers

16.4 Summary of Chapter 16

17: The Run-Ahead Principle

17.1 Metzinger's Call for a Moratorium

17.2 A Moderate Alternative

17.3 Will We Soon Need an AI Welfare Law?

17.4 A Call for Democratic Debate

17.5 Summary of Chapter 17

Stepping Back

Personal Acknowledgements

Funding Acknowledgement

Publisher Acknowledgements

Bibliography

Index.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on July 12, 2024).

ISBN:

0-19-196672-X

0-19-269768-4

OCLC:

1445898741