Essays in Urban and Labor Economics / Jeanna Kenney.

Format:

Book

Thesis/Dissertation

Author/Creator:

Kenney, Jeanna, author.

Contributor:

University of Pennsylvania. Applied Economics, degree granting institution.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Finance.

Public policy.

Applied Economics--Penn dissertations.

Penn dissertations--Applied Economics.

Local Subjects:

Finance.

Public policy.

Applied Economics--Penn dissertations.

Penn dissertations--Applied Economics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (187 pages)

Contained In:

Dissertations Abstracts International 85-12A.

Place of Publication:

[Philadelphia, Pennsylvania] : University of Pennsylvania, 2022.

Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2024

Language Note:

English

Summary:

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I estimate the trade-off between quality and concentration due to occupational licensing and the resulting consequences for market efficiency in the real estate industry. I exploit a policy reform in Texas in 2012 which provides quasi-exogenous variation in the entry cost that real estate salespeople face in order to become brokers. Using a novel dataset of the universe of licensees in a number of states matched with property listing data, I compare counties in Texas with counties in other states in a synthetic difference-in-difference estimation. The reform generates an unintended short-term increase in entry, leading to a 12% increase in the stock of brokers in the average county, before broker supply is restricted in the long term. The increased barrier does not increase broker quality, while market concentration persistently decreases due to the unintended entry effect, suggesting minimal benefits to consumers of restricting entry. However, efficiency, i.e., average broker listing volume, decreases due to entry. I additionally find that costlier licensing leads to a smaller share of entering female and Hispanic brokers. The second chapter studies the impact of agents (e.g., real estate agents, lawyers, etc.) on the propensity of men versus women to utilize aggressive strategies in negotiation. Using a bargaining game, we find that, absent agents, men make more aggressive demands than women. Introducing agents who negotiate on behalf of their clients entirely closes this gender gap. Belief elicitations suggest that agents do not anticipate that men will reward agents for adopting more aggressive negotiation strategies. Finally, the third chapter investigates the role of labor union bargaining power as a determinant of public pension financing. Using a newly updated database of state-level collective bargaining laws, I exploit variation by state, time, and union occupation to test whether legalizing collective bargaining affects the components of pension revenues and expenditures. Evidence from a triple difference design, finds that collective bargaining laws fail to have a significant impact on plan financing components. Event study evidence also shows that pension financing progresses similarly for employees who eventually get collective bargaining and those who do not.

Notes:

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-12, Section: A.

Advisors: Ferreira, Fernando; Committee members: Kessler, Judd; Keys, Benjamin; Sinai, Todd.

Department: Applied Economics.

Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania 2024.

Local Notes:

School code: 0175

ISBN:

9798382835051

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.