Corruption as a Shared Dilemma: Survey Evidence from Legislators and Citizens in Three Countries / Raymond Fisman, Matteo F. Ferroni, Miriam Golden.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Fisman, Raymond.

Contributor:

Ferroni, Matteo F.

Golden, Miriam.

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Series:

Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w32825.

NBER working paper series no. w32825

Language:

English

Physical Description:

1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2024.

Summary:

We conduct parallel surveys of legislators and citizens in three countries to study their tolerance for corruption. In Italy, Colombia, and Pakistan legislators and citizens respond similarly to hypothetical scenarios involving trade-offs between, for example, probity and efficiency: both perceive corruption as undesirable but prevalent. These novel descriptive data further reveal that legislators generally have accurate beliefs about public opinion on corruption and understand its relevance to voters. An informational treatment updates legislators' beliefs about public opinion. The treatment produces downward adjustments among legislators who initially overestimated citizens' anti-corruption preferences. We also present descriptive data that tolerance of corruption is predicted by politician attributes, most notably motivations for entering politics. Finally, results reconfirm partisan bias by voters in evaluations of corruption. Overall, results suggest that barriers to effective anti-corruption policies are unlikely to lie with lack of information by legislators or by their deliberate commitment to corrupt activities.

Notes:

August 2024.

Print version record