Stratified virtue epistemology : a defence / J. Adam Carter.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Carter, J. Adam, 1980- author.

Series:

Cambridge elements. Elements in epistemology, 2398-0567.

Cambridge elements. Elements in epistemology, 2398-0567

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Virtue epistemology.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (73 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2023.

Summary:

This accessible Element defends version of virtue epistemology shown to have all-things-considered advantages over other views on the market. The view is unorthodox, in that it incorporates Sosa's animal/reflective knowledge distinction, which has thus far had few takers. The author shows why embracing a multi-tiered framework is not a liability within virtue epistemology but instead affords it an edge not attainable otherwise. The particular account of knowledge goes beyond Sosa's own view by introducing and incorporating several theoretical innovations (regarding both basing and risk, as well as the introduction of multiple species of reflective knowledge) which are aimed at revamping how we think about 'high-grade' knowledge, how we attain it, and what it demands of us. The result is a new and improved stratified virtue epistemology that can hold up against scrutiny.

Contents:

Cover

Title page

Copyright page

Stratified Virtue Epistemology: A Defence

Contents

Preface

1 Virtue Epistemology: One Level Is Good

1.1 The Basic Core Triad

1.2 Knowledge as Greco-Aptness

1.3 Greco-Aptness and Gettier

1.4 Value of Knowledge

1.5 Temp-Style Cases (Safety without Aptness)

1.6 Comparison: Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology

1.7 Challenge: Testimony

1.8 Interlude: Uni-Level Value Epistemology: Greco-Aptness and Sosa-Aptness

1.9 Challenge: Fake Barns

1.10 Sosa-Aptness and Safety

1.11 Dreaming and (SSS- and SC-) Safety

1.12 Scoreboard So Far

Appendix: Analysing Knowledge: A Sisyphean Folly?

The Negative Abduction Argument

The Distinct Concepts Argument

A Positive Motivation

2 Virtue Epistemology: Two Levels Is Even Better

2.1 FAKE BARN, Redux

2.2 Broad Coherence?

2.3 Introducing Two Levels

2.4 FAKE BARN: The Full Error Theory

2.5 The Place of Coherence in Virtue Epistemology

2.6 Two Levels on the Defence: Challenges from Kornblith

2.6.1 The Proliferation Argument

2.6.2 The Reliability Argument

2.7 Reflective Knowledge: A Conundrum

2.8 Reflective Knowledge Expanded

3 Judgemental Knowledge: New Twists

3.1 From Stratified Knowledge to Stratified Belief

3.2 Judgemental Knowledge 1: From Guidance to Basing

3.3 Judgemental Knowledge 2: Background Conditions and De Minimis Risk

3.3.1 The Overlap Problem

3.3.2 A Solution: Full Aptness and De Minimis Risk

3.4 Concluding Remarks

References.

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 15 Dec 2023).

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN:

9781009079075

1009079077

9781009079877

1009079875

9781009067546

1009067540

OCLC:

1481784539