How can we be equals? : basic equality : its meaning, explanation, and scope / edited by Giacomo Floris and Nikolas Kirby.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Floris, Giacomo, editor.

Kirby, Nikolas Norman Patrick, 1984- editor.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Equality--Philosophy.

Equality.

Ethics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (369 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2024]

Summary:

This volume brings together leading thinkers on basic equality to address these questions. Collectively, they explore the concept of equality in history and criticism, analysing and presenting solutions to the most pressing challenges that have been raised against the principle.

Contents:

Cover

Acknowledgements

Contents

List of Contributors

Basic Equality: An Analytical Introduction

1. Introduction

2. Basic Equality: Key Theses

3. The Meaning of Basic Equality: History and Import of Claiming to Be Equals

3.1 The Multiple Meanings of Basic Equality

3.2 Overview of the Chapters

4. The Explanation of Basic Equality

4.1 The End of Ecumenicism: Why the Basis of Basic Equality Matters

4.2 Grounding and Justification

4.3 The Problem of the Explanation of Basic Equality

4.4 Overview of the Chapters

5. The Scope of Basic Equality

5.1 The Scope Problem: Who Is a Moral Equal?

5.2 Overview of the Chapters

Part I Meaning: History and Critique

1 On the Historical Emergence of Basic Human Equality

2. High-Road Histories

3. Political Equality: Balance and Indifference

4. Human Equality: Aequales and Pares

5. Equality-as-Parity

6. Conclusion

2 Basic and Relational Equality

1. A Question

2. An Inadequate Answer

3. My Aim in This Chapter

4. Are Basic and Relational Equality Propositions of Different Kinds?

5. This Is Not about Moral Realism

6. Factual Similarities and Differences

7. Supervenience

8. Egalitarian Commitments without Supervenience?

9. What Does Relational Equality Supervene Upon?

10. Supervenience and Shapelessness

11. A Summary So Far

12. Basic Equality as a Normative Position

13. Immediate Normative Implications of Basic Equality

14. Basic Equality and Human Dignity

15. Moral Status

16. Doesn't Relational Equality Do Roughly the Same Work?

17. Concept and Conception

18. Differences of Emphasis as Between Basic and Relational Equality

19. Basic Equality as a Ground for Relational Equality

20. Conclusion.

3 Should People Who Are Moral Equals Relate as Social Equals? Should People Who Are Not Moral Equals Relate as Social Unequals?

2. Moral and Social Equality

3. How Does Moral Equality Justify Social Equality?

4. Justifying Social Equality in the Absence of Moral Equality

5. Conclusion

4 Is There a Thing Called Moral Equality? (And Does It Matter if There Isn't?)

1. Do Consequentialism and Non-Consequentialism Accept the Same Principle of Moral Equality?

2. Abandoning Moral Equality

3. Social Status Hierarchy and Animal Ethics

4. Conclusion

Part II Justification: Grounding and Scepticism

5 Basic Equality and the Contexts of Opacity Respect

1. Introduction: Equality and Opacity

2. Levels of Basic Equality

3. The Substantive Grounds for Opacity Respect

4. Contexts of Practical Reason

5. Evaluation versus Evaluative Abstinence, Compatibilism versus Incompatibilism

6. The Compatibilist Account

7. The Incompatibilist Account

8. Conclusion

6 Equal Moral Status and the Collective Nature of Rationality

1. The Puzzle

2. Autonomy and Moral Status

3. Moral Status and Public Status

4. The Puzzle and Range Properties

5. Imperfect Rational Nature

6. The Collective Character of Rational Nature

7. An Intuitive Argument for Equality Despite Different Rational Capacities

8. A More Positive Theoretical Argument for Equality

9. The Contribution Argument for Inequality

10. The Problem with the Contribution Argument

11. The Argument for Equality from the Collective Character of Rationality and Status Individualism

12. Objection from Extreme Disability to the Argument for Equal Status

13. Conclusion

7 Basic Equality: Worth, Luck, and Weight

2. The Problem of Basic Equality

3. Moral Worth

4. Moral Luck

5. Moral Weight.

6. Objections

6.1 Difference in moral options

6.2 Determinism

6.3 Lack of alternative options

6.4 Those without agency

7. Conclusion

8 Equality and Moral Status: Challenges to Their Grounding

1. Types of Moral Equality

2. Degrees of Moral Status

3. The Grounds of Moral Status and Why They Matter

4. Mapping Degrees of Moral Status onto Their Grounds

5. Reasons to Doubt the Continuity View

9 When Equality Needs no Justification

1. Equality as Commitment and Claim

2. From Moral Equality to Moral Judgement

3. The Moral/Material Distinction

Part III Scope: Inclusion and Marginalization

10 The Basis of Children's Moral Equality

2. Moral Equality, Respect, and Children

3. Moral Inferiority and Self-Respect

4. Moral Superiority and Friendship

5. Objections

5.1 The question-begging objection

5.2 The sidestepping objection

11 Basic Human Moral Equality

Eva Feder Kittay

2. The Challenge of Moral Individualism

3. Is Species Membership Morally Irrelevant?

4. The Importance of Empirical Knowledge for Moral Assessments of Other Human Beings

5. Cognitive Ability, Speciesism, and Moral Standing

6. Substituting Hierarchies

7. Grounding Moral Individualism in a Metaphysics

8. Intrinsic Properties Versus Relational Properties

9. What About 'Us' is Morally Relevant?

9.1 Who is the 'Us'?

12 First Among Equals

1. Moral Standing

2. Humans and Animals

3. Human and Animal Interests

4. Treating Moral Equals Differently

5. Treating Humans and Animals Differently

13 Basic Equality, Rational Agency Capacity, and Potentiality

1. The RAC Account

2. RAC's Appeal

3. A Controversial but Defensible Implication

4. A Devastating Objection.

5. A Modified RAC Account Combines Potential and Developed Capacity

6. Discussion of Other Views

Index.

Notes:

Includes index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on April 2, 2024).

ISBN:

0-19-196773-4

0-19-269930-X

OCLC:

1428463913