Could a good God permit so much suffering? : a debate / James Sterba and Richard Swinburne.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Sterba, James P., author.

Swinburne, Richard, author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Suffering--Religious aspects.

Suffering.

God--Goodness.

God.

Apologetics.

Belief and doubt.

Religion--Philosophy.

Religion.

Physical Description:

1 online resource : illustrations.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2024]

Summary:

'Could a Good God Permit So Much Suffering?' presents a debate about whether the kind of world we live in, ridden with horrendous evil, is compatible with the existence of the all-good, all-powerful God of traditional theism. James Sterba puts the case against, and Richard Swinburne argues in favour.

Contents:

Cover

Could a Good God Permit So Much Suffering?: A Debate

Copyright

Dedication

Acknowledgements

Contents

1: Introduction

2: The World's Evils Are Logically Incompatible with God's Existence

I. The Argument from Moral Evil

Goods to Which We Have a Right

First-Order Goods to Which We Have a Right

Second-Order Goods to Which We Have a Right

Goods to Which We Do Not Have a Right

First-Order Goods to Which We Do Not Have a Right

Second-Order Goods to Which We Do Not Have a Right

The General Provision of First-Order Goods to Which We Have a Right

The General Provision of First-Order Goods to Which We Have No Right

Conclusion

II. The Argument from Natural Evil

III. Restrictions on Wrongdoing

IV. Ethics after Creation

V. Not a Moral Agent

VI. Limited God

VII. Summing Up

3: The World's Evils Are Logically Compatible with God's Existence

I. The Nature and Limits of Human Moral Rights

II. Sterba's Evil Prevention Requirements

III. Human Goods and Their Accompanying Necessary Evils

IV. Horrendous Earthly Evils and Glorious Heavenly Goods

4: Response to Swinburne

I. My Argument

II. Swinburne on MEPR I-III

III. More on My Argument

IV. Swinburne's Argument

a. More Freedoms at Issue

b. The Different Stages of Free Actions Employed in MEPR I-III

c. Rejected by Both Perpetrators and Beneficiaries

d. A Choice That Is Not Universalizable

e. More Virtuous

f. Natural Evils

g. Compensation

h. Super-Benefactor

i. Examples

j. A Misinterpretation, a Clarification, and Some Objections

V. A Conclusion and More

a) How I Got Here

5: Response to Sterba's Response

I. Sterba's Main Detailed Objections to My Theodicy

II. My Main Argument Applied to the World's Worst Evils

III. Sterba's Argument from Evolutionary History

IV. Conclusion

Notes

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Guide to Further Reading

Index

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on March 22, 2024).

Other Format:

Print version :

ISBN:

0-19-194385-1

OCLC:

1427726719