Design of constitutions [electronic resource] / Stefan Voigt.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Voigt, Stefan.

Contributor:

Edward Elgar Publishing.

Voigt, Stefan.

Series:

Elgar research reviews in law

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Constitutional law--Economic aspects.

Constitutional law.

Law and economics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (1 v.) ; cm.

Place of Publication:

Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Pub. Ltd., 2012.

Summary:

Almost anywhere in the world, new constitutions are written and passed at almost any time. Over the last couple of years, an increasing number of economists have analysed constitutions based on an economic approach with an emphasis firstly on the (economic) effects of constitutions and followed by the factors determining their content. The contributions assembled in this title go one step further: they ask how the knowledge gained over the last number of years can usefully be applied to constitutional design. This new branch could also be termed applied constitutional economics.

Contents:

Recommended readings (Machine generated): Acemoglu, D. (2005), 'Constitutions, politics and economics: a review essay on Persson and Tabellini's "The Economic Effects of Constitutions"', Journal of Economic Literature, 43 (4), 1025-48.

Acemoglu, D., Cantoni, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. (2009), 'The consequences of radical reform: the French Revolution', NBER Working Paper No. w14831, available at: ssrn.com/abstract=1373341.

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2007), 'On the economic origins of democracy', Daedalus, 136 (1), 160-62.

Blume, L. and Voigt, S. (2011), 'Does organizational design of supreme audit institutions matter? A cross-country assessment', European Journal of Political Economy, 27, 215-29.

Buchanan, J. and Tullock, G. (1962), The Calculus of Consent - Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Congleton, R. (2011), Perfecting Parliament - Constitutional Reform, Liberalism, and the Rise of Western Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cooter, R. (1999), The Strategic Constitution, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Elkins, Z., Ginsburg, T. and Melton, J. (2009), The Endurance of National Constitutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Feld, L.P. and Voigt, S. (2006), 'Making judges independent - some proposals regarding the judiciary', in R.D. Congleton and B. Swedenborg (eds), Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy, Analysis and Evidence, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 251-88.

Gavison, R. (2002), 'What belongs in a constitution?', Constitutional Political Economy, 13 (1), 89-105.

Gerring, J., Thacker, Str. and Moreno, C. (2006), Are Federal Systems Better than Unitary Systems?, Mimeo: Boston University.

Hayo, B. and Voigt, S. (2010), 'Determinants of constitutional change: why do countries change their form of government?', Journal of Comparative Economics, 38 (1), 283-305.

Hayo, B. and Voigt, S. (2012), 'Endogenous constitutions: politics and politicians matter, economic outcomes don't', forthcoming in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.

Keynes, J.N. (1955), The Scope and Method of Political Economy, New York: Kelley.

Lijphart, A. (1992), Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government - Oxford Readings in Politics and Government, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1999), Patterns of Democracy - Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Lorenz, A. (2005), 'How to measure constitutional rigidity. Four concepts and two alternatives', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 17, 339-61.

Lutz, D. (1994), 'Toward a theory of constitutional amendment', American Political Science Review, 88 (2), 355-70.

Mueller, D. (1996), Constitutional Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Murrell, P. (2009), 'Design and evolution in institutional development: the insignificance of the English Bill of Rights', available at: papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1522864.

Ordeshook, P. (1992), 'Constitutional stability', Constitutional Political Economy, 3, 137-75.

Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2003), The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Riker, W. (1975), 'Federalism', in F.I. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds), The Handbook of Political Science, Volume V: Government Institutions and Processes, Reading, MA: Addision Wesley.

Voigt, S. (1999), Explaining Constitutional Change - A Positive Economics Approach, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.

Voigt, S. and Blume, L. (2012), 'The economic effects of federalism and decentralization - a cross- country assessment', Public Choice, 151 (1/2), 229-54.

Widner, J. (2007), 'The effects of constitution writing procedures on choice of terms and patterns of violence: some data, some observations, and many reasons for modesty', paper presented at the Stanford Workshop in Comparative Politics, Palo Alto, CA, 22 January 2007.

Dennis C. Mueller (2005), 'Constitutional Political Economy in the European Union', Public Choice, 124 (112), July, 57-73

Donald L. Horowitz (2002), 'Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes', in Andrew Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, Chapter 1, Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 15-36, references

Arend Lijphart (2002), 'The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy', in Andrew Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy, Chapter 2, Oxford, UK and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 37-54, references

Jon Elster (1995), 'Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process', Duke Law Journal, 45 (2), November, 364-96

Stefan Voigt (2004), 'The Consequences of Popular Participation in Constitutional Choice - Towards a Comparative Analysis', in Anne van Aaken, Christian List and Christoph Luetge (eds), Deliberation and Decision: Economics, Constitutional Theory and Deliberative Democracy, Chapter 8, Aldershot, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 199-229

John M. Carey (2009), 'Does It Matter How a Constitution is Created?', in Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser (eds), Is Democracy Exportable?, Chapter 7, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 155-77, references

Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and Justin Blount (2009), 'Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?', Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 5 (5), December, 201-23

Lorenz Blume and Stefan Voigt (2007), 'The Economic Effects of Human Rights', Kyklos, 60 (4), November, 509-38

Avi Ben-Bassat and Momi Dahan (2008), 'Social Rights in the Constitution and in Practice', Journal of Comparative Economics, 36 (1), March, 103-19

Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland and Guido Tabellini (2007), 'Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies', Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2 (2), 155-88

Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni (2010), 'Endogenous Constitutions', Economic Journal, 120 (543), March, 1-39

Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland and Guido Tabellini (1997), 'Separation of Powers and Political Accountability', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (4), November, 1163-202

Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi (2004), 'Endogenous Political Institutions', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (2), May, 565-611

Roger D. Congleton (2006), 'On the Merits of Bicameral Legislatures: Intragovernmental Bargaining and Policy Stability', in Roger D. Congleton and Brigitta Swedenborg (eds), Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence, Chapter 6, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 163-88

Cecilia Testa (2010), 'Bicameralism and Corruption', European Economic Review, 54 (2), February, 181-98

Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr and Barry R. Weingast (2005), 'Self- Enforcing Federalism', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 21 (1), 103-35

Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (2005), 'Federalism and the Democratic Transition: Lessons from South Africa', American Economic Review, 95 (2), May, 39-43

Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer (2006), 'Direct Democracy: Designing a Living Constitution', in Roger D. Congleton and Brigitta Swedenborg (eds), Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence, Chapter 2, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 39-80

Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller and Stefan Voigt (2009), 'The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy - A First Global Assessment', Public Choice, 140 (3), September, 431-61

Bruce Ackerman (2000), 'The New Separation of Powers', Harvard Law Review, 113 (3), January, 633-729

Stefan Voigt and Eli M. Salzberger (2002), 'Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers', Kyklos, 55 (2), May, 289-310

Tom Ginsburg (2006), 'Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law', New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 38 (4), 707-59

Stefan Voigt, Michael Ebeling and Lorenz Blume (2007), 'Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence - the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council', Journal of Development Economics, 82 (2), March, 348-73

Notes:

The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings.

Description based on online resource; title from title screen (viewed February 13, 2015).

ISBN:

1-78471-429-1