Economics of antitrust law / edited by Benjamin Klein and Andres V. Lerner.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Klein, Benjamin, 1943-

Lerner, Andres V., 1972-

Edward Elgar Publishing.

Series:

Economic approaches to law ; 18.

Economic approaches to law ; 18

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Antitrust law--Economic aspects.

Antitrust law.

Law and economics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (2 v. (1,312 p.)) : ill. ; cm.

Place of Publication:

Cheltenham ; Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar Pub., 2008.

Summary:

This insightful two-volume set presents a careful selection of the most important published papers on the economics of antitrust law. The collection focuses on areas of major importance including market power, horizontal arrangements, and vertical arrangements and exclusionary behaviour. It includes seminal papers on topics such as oligopoly and collusion, horizontal mergers and joint ventures, exclusive dealing and tying and bundling. The Economics of Antitrust Law will be an essential source of reference for economists, lawyers and practitioners concerned with this important and controversial area of law and economics.

Contents:

Recommended readings (Machine generated): Harold Demsetz (1973), 'Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy', Journal of Law and Economics, 16 (1), April, 1-9

William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1981), 'Market Power in Antitrust Cases', Harvard Law Review, 94 (5), March, 937-96

Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan (1983), 'On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits', American Economic Review, 73 (1), March, 82-97

Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande and Steven C. Salop (1987), 'Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law', Georgetown Law Journal, 76 (2), December, 241-69

Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan (1992), 'Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power', Antitrust Law Journal, 61 (1), Summer, 3-16

Benjamin Klein (1993), 'Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak', Supreme Court Economic Review, 3, 43-92

George J. Stigler (1964), 'A Theory of Oligopoly', Journal of Political Economy, 72 (1), February, 44-61

Donald F. Turner (1962), 'The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal', Harvard Law Review, 75 (4), February, 655-706

Richard A. Posner (1969), 'Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach', Stanford Law Review, 21 (6), June, 1562-606

Franklin M. Fisher (1989), 'Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View', RAND Journal of Economics, 20 (1), Spring, 113-24

Jonathan B. Baker (1993), 'Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory', Antitrust Bulletin, XXXVIII (1), Spring, 143-219

Oliver E. Williamson (1968), 'Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs', American Economic Review, 58 (1), March, 18-36

Janusz A. Ordover and Robert D. Willig (1983), 'The 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: An Economic Assessment', California Law Review, 71 (2), March, 535-74

Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1990), 'Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis', American Economic Review, 80 (1), March, 107-26

Jonathan B. Baker (2002), 'Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws', New York University Law Review, 77 (1), April, 135-203

Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece (1990), 'Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4 (3), Summer, 75-96

Carl Shapiro and Robert D. Willig (1990), 'On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4 (3), Summer, 113-30

Aaron Director and Edward H. Levi (1956), 'Law and the Future: Trade Regulation', Northwestern University Law Review, 51 (1), March-April, 281-96

Frank H. Easterbrook (1984), 'The Limits of Antitrust', Texas Law Review, 63 (1), August, 1-40

Ward S. Bowman, Jr. (1957), 'Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem', Yale Law Journal, 67 (1), November, 19-36

George J. Stigler (1963), 'United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking', Supreme Court Review, 152-7

William James Adams and Janet L. Yellen (1976), 'Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90 (3), August, 475-98

Benjamin Klein and Lester F. Saft (1985), 'The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVIII, May, 345-61

Michael D. Whinston (1990), 'Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion', American Economic Review, 80 (4), September, 837-59

Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2002), 'The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries', RAND Journal of Economics, 33 (2), Summer, 194-220

Barry Nalebuff (2004), 'Bundling as an Entry Barrier', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, February, 159-87

Lester G. Telser (1960), 'Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?', Journal of Law and Economics, III, October, 86-105

Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), 'Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms', Journal of Law and Economics, XXXI, October, 265-97

Pauline M. Ippolito (1991), 'Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation', Journal of Law and Economics, XXXIV, October, 263-94

Howard P. Marvel (1982), 'Exclusive Dealing', Journal of Law and Economics, XXV, April, 1-25

Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), 'Contracts as a Barrier to Entry', American Economic Review, 77 (3), June, 388-401

Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer and John S. Wiley, Jr. (1991), 'Naked Exclusion', American Economic Review, 81 (5), December, 1137-45

Benjamin Klein and Andres V. Lerner (2007), 'The Expanded Economics of Free-Riding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-Riding and Creates Undivided Loyalty', Antitrust Law Journal, 74 (2), 473-519

John S. McGee (1958), 'Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case', Journal of Law and Economics, 1, October, 137-69

Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner (1975), 'Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act', Harvard Law Review, 88 (4), February, 697-733

Janusz A. Ordover and Robert D. Willig (1981), 'An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation', Yale Law Journal, 91 (1), November, 8-53

Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop (1986), 'Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price', Yale Law Journal, 96 (2), December, 209-93

Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein (1996), 'Monopolization by "Raising Rivals' Costs": The Standard Oil Case', Journal of Law and Economics, XXXIX, April, 1-47.

Notes:

The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

1-78536-687-4

OCLC:

180478375