Classics in corporate law and economics / edited by Jonathan Macey.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Macey, Jonathan R.

Edward Elgar Publishing.

Series:

Elgar reference collection.

Elgar reference collection

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Corporate governance--Law and legislation.

Corporate governance.

Corporation law--Economic aspects.

Corporation law.

Law and economics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (2 v. (1,376 p.)) ; cm.

Place of Publication:

Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar, 2008.

Summary:

The spate of corporate governance scandals in the USA, Asia and Europe during the late 1990s has renewed interest in the role of corporations in society. International organizations such as the World Bank and OECD have come to recognize that corporate law plays an important role in economic development and GDP growth. In this timely and important collection, Jonathan Macey presents the key papers that have influenced the development of corporate law scholarship. The many topics covered include the foundations of the economics of corporate law, the corporation as a nexus of contracts, corporate law from a Coasean perspective, insider trading and jurisdictional competition. The articles and the editor's authoritative introduction are essential readings for those with an interest in corporate law and its economic underpinnings.

Contents:

Recommended readings (Machine generated): R.H. Coase (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, 4 (16), November, 386-405

Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure', Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-60

Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1989), 'The Corporate Contract', Columbia Law Review, 89, 1416-48

John C. Coffee Jr., (1989), 'The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role', Columbia Law Review, 89, 1618-91

Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1986), 'Close Corporations and Agency Costs', Stanford Law Review, 38, January, 271-301

Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1983), 'Voting in Corporate Law', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVI, 395-427

Jonathan R. Macey (1999), 'Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective', Cornell Law Review, 84, 1266-81

Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1993), 'Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective', University of Toronto Law Journal, 43, 401-24

Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations', Journal of Law and Economics, 22, 233-61

Arnoud W.A. Boot and Jonathan R. Macey (2004), 'Monitoring Corporate Performance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance', Cornell Law Review, 89, 356-93

Ronald J. Gilson (1984), 'Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing', Yale Law Journal, 94 (2), December, 239-313

Ronald J. Gilson (1996), 'Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?', Washington University Law Quarterly, 74, 327-45

Mark J. Roe (2002), 'Corporate Law's Limits', Journal of Legal Studies, XXXI, June, 233-71

Oliver E Williamson (1988), 'Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance', Journal of Finance, XLIII (3), July, 567-91

Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1995), 'Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States', Stanford Law Review, 48, November, 73-112

Clifford W. Smith Jr., and Jerold B. Warner (1979), 'On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants', Journal of Financial Economics, 7, 117-61

Roberta Romano (1991), 'The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7 (1), 55-87

Dennis W. Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel (1983), 'The Regulation of Insider Trading', Stanford Law Review, 35, May, 857-95

David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey (1987), 'A Coasian Model of Insider Trading', Northwestern University Law Review, 80 (6), 1449-72

David D. Haddock and Jonathan R. Macey (1987), 'Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation', Journal of Law and Economics, XXX, October, 311-52

Henry G. Manne (1965), 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control', Journal of Political Economy, 73, 110-20

Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1981), 'The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer', Harvard Law Review, 94 (6), April, 1161-204

Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian (2002), 'The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy', Stanford Law Review, 54, May, 887-951

Richard Roll (1986), 'The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers', Journal of Business, 59 (2, Part 1), 197-216

Ronald J. Gilson (1982), 'Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense', Stanford Law Review, 35, November, 51-67

Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney (1985), 'A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail', Yale Law Journal, 95 (1), November, 13-61

Ralph K. Winter Jr., (1977), 'State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation', Journal of Legal Studies, VI, 251-92

Roberta Romano (1985), 'Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1 (2), Fall, 225-83

Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller (1987), 'Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law', Texas Law Review, 65 (3), February, 469-523

William J. Carney (1997), 'The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters', Journal of Legal Studies, XXVI, January, 303-29

John Pound (1993), 'The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control', New York University Law Review, 68, November, 1003-71

Vikramaditya S. Khanna (2004), 'Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis', Washington University Law Quarterly, 82, 95-141

Mark J. Roe (1991), 'A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance', Columbia Law Review, 91, 10-67.

Notes:

The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings.

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

ISBN:

1-78536-686-6

OCLC:

259801845