Economics of constitutional law / edited by Richard A. Epstein.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Epstein, Richard Allen, 1943-

Edward Elgar Publishing.

Series:

Economic approaches to law ; 25.

Economic approaches to law ; 25

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Constitutional law--Economic aspects--United States.

Constitutional law.

Constitutional law--Economic aspects.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (2 v. (1,240 p.)) ; cm.

Place of Publication:

Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar, 2009.

Summary:

In this thought-provoking collection, Professor Epstein brings together the leading articles which explore the economic approach to the two major issues of constitutionalism. The first volume deals with structural protections that are afforded by the separation of powers, the use of checks and balances, and the institutions of federalism. The second volume deals with the protection of individual rights in connection with property, speech, religion, due process and equality. Both volumes focus on the extent to which assumptions about self-interest and human nature influence the choice of social institutions. They offer extensive comparisons between the classical liberal and social democratic views of constitutional law. Professor Epstein's lengthy and careful introduction seeks to weave together the diverse approaches to constitutional law exhibited in these volumes.

Contents:

Recommended readings (Machine generated): James Madison ([1787] 1961), 'The Federalist. No X. (The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Continued)', in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist, or, The New Constitution, London: John M. Dent and Sons, Ltd, 41-8

Cass R. Sunstein (1985), 'Interest Groups in American Public Law', Stanford Law Review, 38, November, 29-87

Robert Cooter (2002), 'Constitutional Consequentialism: Bargain Democracy versus Median Democracy', Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 3 (1), January, 1-20

Saul Levmore (1992), 'Bicameralism: When are Two Decisions Better than One?', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (2), June, 145-62

Susan Rose-Ackerman (1992), 'Judicial Review and the Power of the Purse', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (2), June, 191-208

Eric R. Claeys (2004), 'Progressive Political Theory and Separation of Powers on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts', Constitutional Commentary, 21, 405-44

Jide Nzelibe (2006), 'A Positive Theory of the War-Powers Constitution', Iowa Law Review, 91, 993-1062

Barry R. Weingast (1995), 'The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 11 (1), April, 1-31

Richard A. Epstein (1987), 'The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power', Virginia Law Review, 73 (8), November, 1387-455

Michael W. McConnell (1988), 'Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure', California Law Review, 76 (2), March, 267-95

J. Robert S. Prichard with Jamie Benedickson (1983), 'Securing the Canadian Economic Union: Federalism and Internal Barriers to Trade', in Michael J. Trebilcock, J. Robert S. Prichard, Thomas J. Courchene and John Whalley (eds), Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union, Chapter 1, Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Ontario Economic Council, 3-50

Jonathan H. Adler (2001), 'The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federalism', Supreme Court Economic Review, 9, 205-41

Jack L. Goldsmith and Alan O. Sykes (2001), 'The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause', Yale Law Journal, 110 (5), March, 785-828

Richard A. Epstein (1988), 'Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent', Harvard Law Review, 102, 5-104

Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright and Christopher J.W. Zorn (1999), 'Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15 (3), October, 549-72

David W. Rohde (1972), 'Policy Goals, Strategic Choice and Majority Opinion Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court', Midwest Journal of Political Science, XVI, 652-82

Jeffrey R. Lax and Charles M. Cameron (2007), 'Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US Supreme Court', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 23 (2), June, 276-302

Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs and Forrest Maltzman (1998), 'Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court', American Journal of Political Science, 42 (1), January, 294-315

Chris W. Bonneau, Thomas H. Hammond, Forrest Maltzman and Paul J. Wahlbeck (2007), 'Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court', American Journal of Political Science, 51 (4), October, 890-905

Jeffrey R. Lax (2007), 'Constructing Legal Rules on Appellate Courts', American Political Science Review, 101 (3), August, 591-604

Frank H. Easterbrook (1982), 'Ways of Criticizing the Court', Harvard Law Review, 95 (4), February, 802-32

Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager (1986), 'Unpacking the Court', Yale Law Journal, 96 (1), November, 82-117

Robert Anderson IV and Alexander M. Tahk (2007), 'Institutions and Equilibrium in the United States Supreme Court', American Political Science Review, 101 (4), November, 811-25

Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller (1998), 'Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals', Yale Law Journal, 107 (7), May, 2155-76

Sean Farhang and Gregory Wawro (2004), 'Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 20 (2), October, 299-330

Jonathan P. Kastellec (2007), 'Panel Composition and Judicial Compliance on the US Courts of Appeals', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 23 (2), June, 421-41

Jeffrey R. Lax (2003), 'Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion, Reputation and the Rule of Four', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 15 (1), 61-86

Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal and Donald Songer (2000), 'Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions', American Political Science Review, 94 (1), March, 101-16

Tracey E. George and Michael E. Solimine (2001), 'Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc', Supreme Court Economic Review, 9, 171-204

Tom S. Clark (2009), 'A Principal-Agent Theory of En Banc Review', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 25 (1), May, 55-79

Linda R. Cohen and Matthew L. Spitzer (1994), 'Solving the Chevron Puzzle', Law and Contemporary Problems, 57 (2), Spring, 65-110

Matt Spitzer and Eric Talley (2000), 'Judicial Auditing', Journal of Legal Studies, XXIX (2), Part 1, June, 649-83

Steven Shavell (1995), 'The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction', Journal of Legal Studies, XXIV (2), June, 379-426

Chad Westerland, Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron and Scott Comparato (2010), 'Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals', American Journal of Political Science, 54 (4), October, 891-905

Walter F. Murphy (1959), 'Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power', American Political Science Review, LIII (4), December, 1017-31

Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller (1990), 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (2), Autumn, 263-300

William N. Eskridge, Jr. (1991), 'Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions', Yale Law Journal, 101 (2), November, 331-455

John A. Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast (1992), 'A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (2), June, 263-79

Jeffrey A. Segal, Chad Westerland and Stefanie A. Lindquist (2011), 'Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model', American Journal of Political Science, 55 (1), January, 89-104

Tom S. Clark (2009), 'The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy', American Journal of Political Science, 53 (4), October, 971-89

Gretchen Helmke (2002), 'The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina under Dictatorship and Democracy', American Political Science Review, 96 (2), June, 291-303

Lee Epstein, Jack Knight and Olga Shvetsova (2001), 'The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government', Law and Society Review, 35 (1), 117-63

Georg Vanberg (2001), 'Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2), April, 346-61

James R. Rogers (2001), 'Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (1), January, 84-99

Joseph L. Smith and Emerson H. Tiller (2002), 'The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law', Journal of Legal Studies, XXXI (1), Part 1, January, 61-82

William H. Riker and Barry R. Weingast (1988), 'Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures', Virginia Law Review, 74 (2), March, 373-401.

Notes:

The recommended readings are available in the print version, or may be available via the link to your library's holdings.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN:

1-78536-280-1

OCLC:

305125662