How governments borrow : partisan politics, constrained institutions, and sovereign debt in emerging markets / Ben Cormier.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Cormier, Ben, author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Debts, Public.

Physical Description:

1 online resource : illustrations

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2024]

Summary:

'How Governments Borrow' reveals how annual borrowing decisions are informed by domestic politics. The book traces the annual fiscal policymaking process in Emerging Markets (EM) to show how a government's partisan policy preferences are a primary determinant of annual external borrowing decisions and thus patterns of debt accumulation.

Contents:

Cover

Title page

Copyright page

Acknowledgements

Contents

1 Introduction

1.1 EM Sovereign Debt Structure

1.2 South Africa Vignette: Borrowings and Consequences

1.3 The EM Sovereign Financing Landscape

1.3.1 Hard vs. Local Currency Debt

1.3.2 EM External Borrowing Options

1.3.3 The External Borrowing Trade-off

1.4 The International Political Economy of EM Sovereign Debt

1.4.1 Sovereign Debt Models: Creditworthiness, Discipline, and Pull Factors

1.4.2 Market Distortions &amp

Push Factors

1.4.3 Official Creditors

1.4.4 Borrower Autonomy

1.5 Partisan Borrowing and Debt Accumulation: The Theory in Brief

1.5.1 Class, Partisanship, and Borrowing

1.5.2 Methods

1.6 Implications of Partisan External Sovereign Debt Accumulation in EMs

1.6.1 Demand-Side Limits to Market Discipline of Government Partisanship in Sovereign Debt

1.6.2 Borrower Autonomy in Models of Market and Official Credit Flows

1.6.3 The Politics of Borrower Preferences and EM Sovereign Debt Accumulation

1.6.4 The Role and Effect of DMOs

1.6.5 DMO Constraints as a Microcosm of Limits to Institutional Effects in the Macroeconomy

1.7 Outline of the Book

2 Partisan Politics and Constrained Institutions: A Model of Sovereign Debt Accumulation in Emerging Markets

2.1 Introduction

2.2 DMOs: A Primer

2.3 DMOs, Government Partisanship, and EM External Debt: A Model and Hypothesis

2.3.1 Debt Accumulation

2.3.2 Borrowing Strategies

2.3.3 Partisan Politics

2.3.4 EM Partisanship and External Borrowings

2.4 Implications for Sovereign Debt and Political Economy

2.4.1 Institutions in Sovereign Debt

2.4.2 Institutions in Comparative Political Economy

2.5 Conclusion

3 Testing the Partisan Model

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Data

3.2.1 Dependent Variable

3.2.2 Independent Variables.

3.2.3 Control Variables

3.3 Empirical Strategy

3.3.1 Modelling Strategies

3.3.2 Post-Treatment Bias

3.4 Results

3.4.1 Robustness Tests

3.5 Conclusion

4 South Africa and Botswana

4.1 Introduction

4.2 South Africa

4.2.1 ANC Partisanship

4.2.2 The Budget: Setting the Financing Requirement

4.2.3 The ALM: Deciding How to Finance the Budget

4.2.4 State-Owned Enterprises

4.2.5 South Africa Summary

4.3 Botswana

4.3.1 BDP Partisanship

4.3.2 Fiscal Rules Written by the BDP Reinforce Conservatism

4.3.3 Borrowing Process and Choices

4.4 Comparison and Conclusion

5 Peru

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Setting the Financing Requirement: Budgets and Politics

5.2.1 The 1999 Fiscal Law

5.2.2 Annual Indebtedness Laws

5.3 Borrowing Process and Politics

5.3.1 Line Ministries and Cabinet

5.3.2 SOEs and Other Guarantees

5.4 Peru Foreign Borrowing from 1990 to 2015

5.4.1 The Late 1980s

5.4.2 Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000)

5.4.3 Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006)

5.4.4 Alan Garcia (2006-2011)

5.4.5 Ollanta Humala (2011-2016)

5.5 Conclusion

6 Thailand

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Fiscal and Debt Laws

6.3 Borrowing Process

6.3.1 PDMO Borrowing Options and Criteria

6.3.2 Politics and PDMO Foreign Borrowing Decisions

6.3.3 SOEs

6.4 Thai Foreign Borrowing from 1990 to 2015

6.4.1 Pre-AFC (1990-1996)

6.4.2 The AFC and Post-AFC Democrats (1997-2001)

6.4.3 Thai Rak Thai (2001-2006)

6.4.4 Post-TRT (2006-2015)

6.5 Conclusion

7 Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Research and Policy Implications

7.2.1 Demand-Side Limits to Market Discipline

7.2.2 Borrower Autonomy, Domestic Politics, and Sovereign Debt Structure

7.2.3 The Cyclicality of EM Sovereign Debt Flows

7.2.4 Clearer Theory and Measurement in the IPE of Sovereign Debt.

7.2.5 DMO Practices and Effects (Transparency and Diversification)

7.2.6 Deepening Domestic Public Debt Markets

7.2.7 The Varying Role of Institutions in Different Areas of Public Debt and Different Areas of the Economy

7.3 Looking Ahead

Appendix : Interviews List

References

Index.

Notes:

Also issued in print: 2024.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on January 22, 2024).

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

0-19-199144-9

0-19-888274-2

OCLC:

1418718995