A telic theory of trust / J. Adam Carter.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Carter, J. Adam, 1980- author.

Series:

Oxford scholarship online.

Oxford scholarship online

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Trust--Philosophy.

Trust.

Virtue epistemology.

Physical Description:

1 online resource

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, [2024]

Summary:

'A Telic Theory of Trust' approaches trust as a kind of aimed performance, capable of not only success but also of competence and aptness. J. Adam Carter shows how this illuminate the nature of trust, the difference between good and bad trusting, and practices of cooperation in general.

Contents:

Cover

A Telic Theory of Trust

Copyright

Dedication

Contents

Preface

1: What Is Good Trusting?

1. Introduction

2. Good Trusting as Good Believing: The Doxastic Account

3. Alternative Norms on Good Trusting: Non-Doxastic Accounts

3.1 Good Trusting as Good Affect

3.2 Good Trusting as Good Conation

4. Concluding Remarks

2: Trust as Performance

2. Telic Normativity

3. Trust as Performance

4. Taking Stock

4.1 vs. the Doxastic Account

4.2 vs. the Affective Account

4.3 vs. the Conative Account

5. Concluding Remarks

3: Forbearance and Distrust

1. Varieties of Trust qua Performance: Some Distinctions

2. From Trusting to Distrusting

2.1 Wide-Scope Forbearance from Trust (PyrrhonianMistrust and Non-Pyrrhonian Mistrust)

2.2 Narrow-Scope Intentionally AimedForbearance from Trusting: Deliberative Distrust(Successful, Competent, and Apt)

2.3 Narrow-Scope Functionally Aimed Forbearance from Trusting: Implicit Distrust (Successful, Competent, and Apt)

3. Concluding Remarks

4: Trust, Pistology, and the Ethics of Cooperation

2. Implicit and Deliberative Trust

3. A Structural Analogy

5: Deliberative Trust and Convictively Apt Trust

2. The Substance of Apt Deliberative Trust

2.1 First-Order Trusting Competence

2.2 Second-Order Trusting Competence

3. The Structure of Apt Deliberative Trust

6: Trust, Risk, and Negligence

2. Sosa's Answer to the General Non-Negligence Question

3. An Underdetermination Problem for Sosa's Answer to the General Non-Negligence Question

4. De Minimis Normativism

5. De Minimis Normativism and the Specific Non-Negligence Question

5.1 Proof of Concept: Easy Cases

5.1.1 Loan Payment

5.1.2 Mr. X

5.2 Diagnosis of Intermediate Cases

6. Concluding Remarks

7: Trust, Vulnerability, and Monitoring

1. Trust and Vulnerability to Betrayal

2. Trust-Relevant Vulnerability to Betrayal:Evaluating the Options

2.1 A Simple Perceived Risk Account

2.2 Towards an Objective Risk Account

2.3 A Performance-Normative Account

2.4 Objections and Replies

3. Trust and Monitoring

4. Conclusion

8: Therapeutic Trust

1. Introduction

2. Hieronymi's Pure/Impure Approach

3. Frost-Arnold's 'Unity' Approach

4. Jones's 'Normative Difference' Approach

5. Therapeutic Trust: (Telic) Default and Overriding

6. Summing Up

7. Objections and Replies

7.1 Objection 1

7.2 Objection 2

7.3 Objection 3

9: Trust and Trustworthiness

2. Trust and Trustworthiness: Doing versus Being?

3. Structural Analogies with Practical Reasoning

4. Symmetric Evaluative Normativity: Trustor and Trustee

5. Objections and Replies

(a) Objection

(b) Objection

(c) Objection

6. Concluding Remarks

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource and publisher information; title from PDF title page (viewed on March 16, 2024).

Other Format:

Print version :

ISBN:

0-19-198246-6

OCLC:

1427198169